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The modern history of the Jharkhand region in India can be understood as a tale of incomplete pacification of 
‘tribal’ communities by both the colonial and postcolonial regimes. Starting with the introduction of alien land 
tenure laws by the British, the increasing reach of inimical political and commercial interests, the tapping of huge 
mineral reserves as part of India’s development march have adversely affected adivasi communities through 
land alienation, displacement and declining access to common property resources. Adivasis have responded 
through issue-based people’s movements in various areas that oppose, for instance, reservoir dams, mining 
activity or forestry initiatives. 
 
Christians have historically played a leading role in the clamour for tribal autonomy even if they account for only 
four percent of the population. This paper attempts to chart what the intensely socialized generation of Christian 
political activists starting in the 1930s has transmuted into and how activists and the organised church respond to 
changed circumstances. Based on field visits to Ranchi district, plus a case study of the Koel Karo agitation, this 
study assesses the role of Christian social movement activists – the nature and efficacy of their involvement, 
their equation with mainline churches and their relationship with non-Christian adivasi activists.  
 
It argues that a sizeable Christian institutional presence creates the context for politicising activists and 
significantly sustains the discourse of subordination that undergirds tribal politics in the state. For these activists, 
attachment to land privileges adivasi identity over notions of religious belonging which, in turn, is arguably linked 
to distinct legacies of conversion. Christians are active in a range of informal protest associations that drive 
popular agitations and are involved in securing adivasi rights in the newly-formed state. For most part Christian 
activists are not driven by religious faith nor sponsored by foreign missionary groups and religious differences 
have not notably undermined collaboration with non-Christian adivasis. The church leadership is sympathetic to 
social movements overall but conservative cultural stances of the clergy inhibit collaborative scope. 
Understanding the dynamics of Christian social activism is, in part, significant owing to impending 
(mis)representations of social movements in a state marked by a stalemate between adivasi interests and the 
government’s industrialising agenda amid the competing pressures of ‘investor confidence’, Hindu nationalism 
and Maoist insurgency. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper is a preliminary attempt to assess the impact of Christian social activists on issues 
facing adivasis (tribals /aboriginal peoples) in the state of Jharkhand in contemporary India. This 
has been prompted by a few factors. One that academic studies gauging the contemporary 
interplay of Christian institutions and actors with socio-political issues are relatively few. Recent 
studies have, for instance, dealt with the indigenously framed cultural authenticity of Indian 
Christians (by demonstrating its non-Western origins) (Frykenberg 2003); have tackled the 
sociology of belief and Christian organisation (Robinson 2003) or reviewed the status of 
Christians in the making of the Indian Constitution and the internal (theological) debates within 
the community linked to conversion, the relationship with the dominant Hindu culture and its 
outlook towards pressing issues of caste and poverty (Kim 2003).  
 
Meanwhile, historians continue to maintain polarised views on the effects of Christian 
conversion, institutions and missionary actors in the colonial period. The discipline is 
differentiated along those who see a Saidian continuity between missionary practice and colonial 
desire; contending that missionaries were so deeply implicated with the colonial agenda that they 
could not possibly undermine colonial interests. The contrarian tradition represented, in part, by 
Robert Frykenberg, G.A. Oddie, Duncan Forrester, Susan Billington Harper attempt to 
demonstrate the destabilizing effects of missionary practice, contending that a combination of 
outright missionary activism, Christian belief and newer modes of social organization through 
institution building have unsettled pre-existing social orders. They argue that Christian missions 
during colonial rule had democratising impacts on a number of exploitative contexts such as the 
case of Indigo planters in Bengal, caste-based oppression in south India – as those of the 
Shanars, Pariahs and Pulayas in the Travancore state and the various untouchable castes in the 
‘Telugu country’ etc.1  
 
Amid this there is demonstrable lack of chronicling the activist agenda of Indian Christians 
including, for instance, the mobilisation of subordinate groups such as dalits (former untouchable 
castes) in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, the dynamics of ethnicity, militancy and faith in 
Northeast India, and the effect of missionary societies in the adivasi heartland of central India 
                                                 
1  Robert Eric Frykenberg, (2002), Christians and Missionaries in India: Cross-Cultural Communication since 1500. 
Richmond: Curzon; G. A. Oddie (1979), Social Protest In India: British Protestant Missionaries And Social Reforms, 1850-
1900, New Delhi: 1979; Duncan B. Forrester (1980), Caste And Christianity: Attitudes And Policies On Caste Of Anglo-
Saxon Protestant Missions In India, London: Curzon Press; Dick Kooiman, Conversion and Social Equality in India: The 
Church Missionary Society in South Travancore in the 19th Century, New Delhi: Manohar, 1989 and Susan Billington Harper 
(2000), In The Shadow Of The Mahatma: Bishop V.S. Azariah and the Travails of Christianity in British India, Grand Rapids: 
W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co. That Christian mission, not colonialism, altered Indian social practice has come to receive 
a measure of acceptance.  Copley writes, “At no stage did the Empire ever challenge Indian religions and social 
institutions, and above all, caste, in the way Mission did. There was a fierceness and wide scope to the challenge 
posed by Mission which compels its discussion as a distinctive ideology.”  (Copley 1998:  6).  The ameliorative 
impact of Christian societies among marginalised communities has received greater recognition in recent years, 
principally occasionally by Hindu nationalist rhetoric and attacks on Christian minorities. Historian Sumit Sarkar 
writes: “[M]issionary complicity with colonialism in India has also been much exaggerated and simplified. Early 
Company rulers like Hastings and Cornwallis, far from encouraging missionaries, often developed close 
collaborative relations with orthodox Brahman literati, and the Baptist mission had to set up its first outpost in 
Serampur, then outside British Bengal.  Later, too, there have been many missionary critics of colonial policies.  
Above all, at the other end of the social scale, recent historical research is increasingly highlighting the extent to 
which sustained Christian philanthropic and educational work have had an empowering impact on significant 
sections of adivasis, dalits and poor and subordinated groups in general.” Sumit Sarkar, ‘Conversions and the Sangh 
Parivar’, The Hindu, 9 November 1999. 
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ranging from south Gujarat to Orissa. This is a striking deficiency considering the magnified role 
of Christians in public discourse owing to the confrontation between an activist Christianity and 
Hindu nationalism, particularly after 1998.2 As noted this contest of social forces has not been 
adequately mapped, partly because of an intellectual genealogy of disdain for religion in general, 
and Christianity in particular. Admittedly though, besides poor funding, researching Christianity 
and politics sometimes involves the attendant disadvantages of investigating obscure religious 
groupings owing to the bewildering proliferation of Christian societies, particularly on the 
Protestant evangelical side, and their unwillingness to be amenable to academic inquiry owing to 
either tenuous political contexts or ambiguous sources of funding.  
 
This paper looks at the nature of Christian social activism and its role in the various social 
movements that endeavour to restore adivasi rights in Jharkhand. The underlying motif of these 
struggles is two fold: one, to resist the encroachment on adivasi land and common property 
resources through frenetic industrialisation that threaten their livelihood and, secondly, to 
campaign for adivasi control over state resources, through a focus on effecting the principles of 
decentralisation by granting power to traditional adivasi self-governing institutions. It is argued 
here that the institutional advantage of Christian actors in league with majority sarna (i.e. non-
Christian adivasi) activists constitutes a frontline for tribal struggles against inimical interests. 
Despite the political limits of what Stuart Corbridge calls the ‘ideology of tribal economy and 
society’, that very ideology is being deployed to secure minimalist ends for adivasi communities 
in areas of tribal concentration.  
 
Christian activists have long been active in the modern history of Chotanagpur (as the region 
was traditionally known). An entire generation of Christian tribal politicians, emerging from a 
comparatively earlier access to education, founded and established the movement for state 
autonomy that started in the late 1930s, with the active support of the German Evangelical 
Lutheran Church. Christian politicians dominated political associations like the Adibasi 
Mahasabha and the subsequent Jharkhand Party which became the largest opposition entity in 
the Bihar Assembly in the 1950s with figures like Jaipal Singh, Theodore Surin, Ignace Beck, 
Paul Dayal, Julius Tigga, Boniface Lakra, Samuel Purti, N.E. Horo, and Justin Richard working 
in tandem with prominent non-Christians leaders like Bandiram Oraon, Theble Oraon and 
Kartik Oraon.3  In fact, till the 1980s, when the demand for a separate statehood for Jharkhand 
got wider currency among the non-tribals, the movement was reportedly dismissed as being a 
‘Christian conspiracy’ or as the work of the ‘Fathers’. There is a sense now that Christian 
activism has retreated and been superseded by the frenetic nature of ethnoregionalist clamour 
starting with the merger of the Jharkhand Party into the Congress Party in 1963 and later 
splitting into various factions, the locus of social movement activity shifting to agrarian struggles 
in the Santal Parganas led by Shibu Soren’s Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) in the mid 1970s, 
                                                 
2 This phase was inaugurated by the attacks on Christian churches in the Dangs district of Gujarat in December 
1998 and 1999, the burning of Australian missionary Graham Staines and his two sons in January 1999 and the 
heated debate on conversions that followed culminating in a controversial visit to India of Pope John Paul II in 
November 2000 where he expressed his hope that the new millennium will yield a ‘harvest of faith’. Indian 
evangelicalism has been assailed in some quarters for the unthinking embrace of fundamentalist values of American 
evangelicals that is said to not only foster a degree of financial dependence but also the adoption of elements of a 
triumphalist illiberal religiosity that is a feature of some of its strands. An extended expose titled “George Bush Has 
a Big Conversion Agenda in India,” Tehelka, February 7, 2004, is representative of the outrage caused (in liberal 
circles) by the interest of American evangelicals in converting India.  
3  See chapter 2 in Agapit Tirkey, Jharkhand Movement: A Study of its Dynamics, (New Delhi: Other Media 
Communications, 2002). chapter 2 and L. P. Vidyarthi and K. N. Sahay, The Dynamics of Tribal Leadership in Bihar 
(Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, 1978).  
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the agitationist phase of the All Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU) in the mid 1980s leading to 
the formation of the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council in 1995 prior to the formation of the 
Jharkhand state in November 2000.4 This paper attempts to chart what the intensely socialized 
generation of Christian political activists in the 1950s and 1960s has mutated into and how the 
organized church has responded to the changed circumstances.  
 
Situating adivasi resistance 
 
A study of Christian activism is particularly central to the question of adivasi political coherence 
in contemporary Jharkhand whose politics is characterised by a tension between, as noted, 
pervasive adivasi disenchantment and the developmentalist urge of a political class that has a 
weak hold on state power. Adivasi groups feel cheated of state power having watched parties of 
‘dikus’ (outsiders) like the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) bandwagon on a 
momentum for statehood that they created till the early 1990s only to ultimately lose political 
power. (To illustrate the antagonism towards a separate state for Jharkhand among non-tribals, 
adivasi auto drivers in Ranchi were reportedly harassed frequently by the police for putting up 
‘Jai Jharkhand’ or ‘Johar!’ stickers on their vehicles.) The persistent sympathy among adivasis for 
Shibu Soren despite the dubious circumstances in which he was installed as Chief Minister by 
the state Governor briefly in February 2005, without demonstrable support of legislative 
majority, is representative of that urge to see genuine adivasi rule in Jharkhand.5 
 
Meanwhile BJP-led regimes, which ruled the state from 2000-2006, have embarked on an 
industrialising agenda geared to shore its electoral prospects and placate corporate backers and 
have thereby encountered resistance from adivasi groups.6 The new Industrial Policy, that the 
BJP-led government unveiled in 2001, promised an investment friendly climate for foreign 
companies in a host of areas including power and ‘mineral development’ that would entail 
further appropriation of adivasi land – principally through the Land Acquisition Act (1894) that 
authorised the government to take over land for public purposes.7  This is inevitable because 
Jharkhand has 38 percent of India’s mineral wealth. It has 33 % of India’s coal, 47% of mica, 
34% of copper, 24% iron ore, 17% of graphite in India.8 In May 2005, the BJP-led government 
hired McKinsey consultants to draw a road map for mineral development that was expected to 
advance the agenda of the industrial policy.9 
                                                 
4 For a close reading of internal dynamics in the Jharkhand autonomy movement, see Amit Prakash, Jharkhand: 
Politics of Development and Identity (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2001); chapters 3-5 in Tirkey, Jharkhand 
Movement: A Study of its Dynamics, op.cit., K. S. Singh, ‘Tribal Autonomy Movements in Chotanagpur’, in K. S. Singh 
(ed.) Tribal Movements in India, Vol. 2 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1983), 1-29; and chapter 4 titled ‘The Tradition of 
Protest’ in Susana Devalle, Discourses of Ethnicity: Culture and Protest in Jharkhand, (New Delhi: Sage, 1992), 111-149.   
5 The Governor of Jharkhand invited Soren to form the government in March 2005 even though the JMM-
Congress alliance had fewer legislators than the BJP-led Hindu nationalist alliance. Soren resigned soon after he 
failed to win a trust vote in the legislature. See Purnima Tripathi, ‘Stuck in Controversy’, Frontline, 12-25 March 2005 
at http://www.flonnet.com/fl2206/stories/20050325002002500.htm  
6 Three Chief Ministers from BJP were at the helm in Jharkhand from November 2000-September 2006. Madhu 
Koda, India’s first non-party ‘independent’ Chief Minister took over in September 2006, underlining the issue of 
political division in the state.  
7
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_Acquisition_Act for a summary of its provisions and 
http://dolr.nic.in/hyperlink/acq.htm for full text of the Act.  
8 According to the CII, diamond major De Beers and 11 other companies have submitted application to undertake 
aerial survey to locate mineral and metal concentration in the state. See Confederation of Indian Industry report 
‘Business opportunities in Jharkhand: A Study’ at  
http://www.ciionline.org/Eastern/regionalfocus/853/images/Jharkhand.pdf accessed 24 May 2005.  
9 Ambar Singh Roy, ‘IL&FS, McKinsey to draw Jharkhand minerals, farm sector roadmap’, Business Line, 14 May 
2005. Also see ‘CM seeks McKinsey hand’ at 
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The Industrial Policy document pointedly does not mention the phrase ‘Scheduled Areas’ that 
enjoy special constitutionally protected measures for adivasis. The new policy intends to form a 
high level committee to review the applicability and relevance of certain Acts obliquely including 
the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, the principal protective legal instrument for safeguarding adivasi 
interests in the province.10 It also says wasteland / degraded forest may be made available by the 
State government which would doubtless spark fresh agitations should such measures be 
effected.  This is totally contrary to provision of existing tenancy acts.11 
 
Ongoing industrialising projects have provoked several agitations owing to displacement of 
adivasis by alleged ‘land grabbing’ policies. A few illustrative instances would include the 
movement against the ‘Pilot Project Netarhat Field Firing Range’. 12  In 2004 the Union 
government issued a notification of 1471 square kilometres for the army firing range and its 
plans to acquire land for the impact area of 188 square kilometres and camping ground of 18 
square kilometres in area across Latehar and Gumla districts which would affect 262,853 people 
of whom 90 percent (236567) are tribals. Activists allege that the choice of the area for a firing 
range was repeatedly moved from a non-scheduled area to a tribal dominated area. Locals have 
been resisting land survey attempts since 1993 and in January and August 2004, the Army fixed 
dates for firing practice forcing the evacuation of some 10000 people in winter and the hectic 
monsoon season.13 
 
Another ongoing agitation has been waged by the Rajmahal Pahad Bachao Andolan in the 
Pachwara block of Pakur district against the acquisition of 1704 acres for captive coal mining by 
PANEM, a joint venture company forged by Punjab State Electricity Board and Eastern 
Minerals and Trading Agency (EMTA). The government acquired a total of 41 square kilometres 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.firstpeoplesfirst.in/index.php?subaction=showfull&id=1117176166&archive=&start_from=&ucat=6
& 
10 See Article 31.6 of Industrial Policy of Jharkhand 2001, Government of Jharkhand, Department of Industries, at  
http://jharkhand.nic.in/governance/indpolicy.htm or page 31 at  
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN015038.pdf 
11 In at least one instance to confirm this, the Bihar government issued an order in 1978 to officials involved in 
survey and settlement operations. It said ‘the race there which cleared the forest, made cultivable land, established 
the villages for their children are the owners of the village.’ This is also confirmed in Para 45 of the settlement of 
Porahat territory. It says, ‘a second main difference between the Munda Khuntkatti intact village of the Porahat and 
the Ranchi type is that in Ranchi the jungles and waste lands are the property of the Khuntkatti.’ See ‘Instruction for 
the Recording of the Lands of the Adivasis of Mundari Khuntkatti and Bhuinhari tenants,’ Government of Bihar 
order, dated 23 February 1978. I’m grateful to PNS Surin, retired Additional Magistrate, Bihar Administrative 
Service, for drawing my attention to this order. Reid’s settlement Ranchi district also confirms this. ‘There is no part 
of the Ranchi district in which the aborigines have succeeded  in retaining any considerable share of their 
proprietary rights in the soil, save a small are in the present Khunti subdivision, where the Mundari khuntkattidars 
have succeeded in retaining their ancient rights unimpaired to this day. Mundari khuntkatti tenancy is now not 
transferable by sale, save in the special cases referred to in Section 240 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act.’ J. Reid,  
Final Report on the Survey and Settlement Operations in the District of Ranchi, Calcutta: Government of Bengal Press, 1912, 
p. 14. For the Porahat settlement see F.E.A. Taylor, Final Report on the Revision Survey and Settlement Operation of Porahat 
Estate, District Singbhum, 1928-32, p. 17. 
12  For a sample of ongoing land related anti-mining movements and organisations see 
http://www.birsa.in/campaigns.htm . An overview of adivasi human development indicators in Jharkhand and 
patterns of displacement linked to development schemes is available at Stan Swamy, ‘Dignity and Basic Rights of 
Jharkhandis,’ Communalism Combat, February-March 2004, Vol. 10, No. 96, 
at http://www.sabrang.com/cc/archive/2004/mar04/cover8.html accessed 13 February 2005.  
13 See Visthapan ka Aathank: Pilot Project Netarhat Jan Andolan (Latehar: Kendriya Jan Sangharsh Samiti: 2005) and 
‘Jharkhand tribals protest army firing range’ http://indiaenews.com/2006-08/19543-jharkhand-tribals-protest-
army-firing.htm , posted 2 September 2006.  
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in the area displacing 250 families who have resisted this fiercely with the aid of civil liberties 
organisations.14 This has provoked a fairly brutal police crackdown allegedly at the behest of the 
company with the movement’s leaders being arrested on trumped up charges. In fact the one 
individual who spent the longest prison sentence of 16 months owing to the agitation was a 
schoolteacher, Joseph Soren, who is also the local Pentecostal minister.15 The agitation against 
the Koel Karo Hydroelectric Power Corporation that would have displaced 16000 families in 
256 villages is another significant anti-dam movement stretching over 30 years, which we will 
return to later as it is located in an area of Christian concentration.  
 
It is easy to dismiss such movements as the inevitable by-product of uneven development, 
particularly when set against the gains that adivasis in Jharkhand have made since independence. 
A misreading of Stuart Corbridge’s scholarship, for instance, might lead one to doubt the 
objective conditions that sustain adivasi struggles in Jharkhand. In various papers over the last 
25 years characterized by a strong empiricist flavour, Corbridge has demonstrated that the tribal 
component in Chotanagpur has not only weakened demographically in relation to non-adivasi 
communities but has also experienced internal class differentiation that militates against effective 
pan-tribal mobilization. In doing so Corbridge has effectively undermined Myron Weiner’s ‘sons 
of the soil’ model and the ‘internal colonialism’ model of ethnoregionalism that drew attention 
to the aboriginal disaffection toward the industrializing Nehruvian developmentalist narrative 
and the exploitative presence of ‘outsiders’ that were causing irreparable damage to adivasi 
livelihoods, communities and habitat.  
 
The substantive thrust of the Corbridgian corpus is that adivasis categorised as Scheduled Tribes 
(STs) were never a majority in the region to begin with since independence. He demonstrates 
that adivasis benefited from job reservations granted to STs and made strides towards achieving 
a middle class status that has allowed them to speculate in the land market etc; a process 
corresponded by the influx of non-adivasi ‘outsiders’ principally from north Bihar. All this has 
unsettled the social and spatial ordering of adivasi communities that unravels notions of ethnic 
closure, simplicity, geographical isolation that undergird what he calls the ‘ideology of tribal 
economy and society’ that has sustained ethnic politics in the region.16 A combination of adivasi 
differentiation (through enlarged access to education and jobs) and demographic weakness thus 
provides a stronger account, Corbridge reckons, of the various failures of the autonomy 
movement than, simply, a factional model of Jharkhandi politics.  
 
Be that as it may, Corbridge’s work should be read as a structural account for Jharkhand 
movement’s lack of political traction over the years rather than as evidence for the historical 
dissolution of core adivasi concerns relating to ‘jal, jungle, zameen’ (water, forests and land). In 
fact, Corbridge is careful to point out that the reservations ‘has not brought a tribal middle class 
into existence; rather it has been captured by a pre-existing tribal elite’, which is predominantly 
male17  and many of whom originate in urban areas (Corbridge 2000: 64). To make up for 
                                                 
14 For details of the issues see K. Balchand, ‘Tribals up in arms in Jharkhand, The Hindu, 3 October 2003 and Stan 
Swamy, ‘An Alternate People’s Policy on Rehabilitation’  at http://pucl.net/kitspress/?p=18, accessed 3 September 
2006.  
15 Interviews with activists, Ranchi, April 2005.  
16 Stuart Corbridge’s articles referred to in this section are: ‘Ousting Singbonga: The Struggle for India’s Jharkhand’, 
in P. Robb (ed.), Dalit Movements and Meanings of Labour in India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993, 153-82; 
‘Competing Inequalities: The Scheduled Tribes and the Reservations System in India’s Jharkhand’, Journal of Asian 
Studies, 2000, 59: 62-85 and ‘The Continuing Struggle for India’s Jharkhand: Democracy, Decentralization and the 
Politics of Names and Numbers’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 2002, 40 (3): 55-71.  
17 Women are likely to get into Class III jobs as higher qualified posts are perceived as gender neutral while jobs like 
peons, clerks, cooks or gardeners are still coded as ‘male jobs’ (Corbridge 2000: 76) 
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‘hideously dated and incomplete’ official data, he computes the nature of tribal class 
differentiation on the basis of interviewing 205 respondents from 185 households working in 
public sector concerns. He puts the tribal middle class component at 10 to 15 percent in Ranchi 
and Singhbhum districts. Even though there is an increasing incidence of tribals appearing for 
Class I and Class II jobs as educational access increases, ‘the system is not delivering Class I and 
Class II jobs to tribals in way envisioned by the framers of the Constitution (ibid: 80).  He notes 
that for many years the Scheduled Tribes have failed to fill their complements of government 
jobs and that ‘most of the jobs filled were in Class III and (more so) Class IV (ibid: 70). His 
sample leads him to believe that poorer educated tribals are relatively more represented in Class 
II jobs than Class IV jobs, but considers this less significant in view of the overall situation that 
middle class tribal families are more likely to get into Class IV jobs (constables, forest guards, 
sweepers, gardeners etc) than Class II jobs (Block Development Officer, heads of police station 
etc) [ibid: 76, emphasis mine]. Notably, tribals are ‘still excluded’ from private labour markets 
and to indicate the scale of difference that quotas have made, Corbridge states that ‘for every 
1,000 STs in reserved jobs there must be almost 100,000 not so employed’ (ibid: 79).  
 
Thus, even though Corbridge remains a persistent critic of stereotypical accounts of tribal 
communities by focusing on internal differentiation, he nonetheless sets them against the 
backdrop of various dimensions of adivasi exclusion in the region. While establishing a critical 
distance from the three models of ethnoregionalism that he evaluates, Corbridge does affirm 
some of their claims about the dismal conditions of the adivasis. For instance, he writes in a 
1993 essay in a fashion reminiscent of the ‘internal colonialism’ thesis: ‘Although a committed 
local opposition still exists, the Jharkhand is becoming a land of dams and mines, of timber 
plantations, factories and army units. Given the power of the state, the land of the forests may 
soon be no more (Corbridge 1993: 139). Nearly a decade later, he cannot ‘deny that large 
numbers of adivasi people have been marginalized by the processes of economic 
development…or have been its major victims in terms of loss of lands’ (Corbridge 2002: 63).  
 
Adivasi life is thus beset by the paradox of the state’s developmental inadequacy and its 
excessive coercive capacity that has its roots in or is, alternatively, exacerbated by illiberal, 
exploitative social groups. This translates into struggles over adivasi lands at both a personal and 
collective plane. Thus some of the figures are compelling, particularly in view of the resource 
extraction that Jharkhand has been subject to over the last century. Like in the rest of adivasi 
heartland from northern Maharashtra, Gujarat through Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, the 
upper reaches of Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, tribals have been the principal victims of India’s 
industrial march through dispossession of land, inadequate or non-existent rehabilitation 
programmes, poor levels of literacy, continued subjection to rapacious interests in the form of 
landlords, moneylenders or labour middlemen (to name a few) and abysmal working conditions, 
particularly as informal labour, in industrial activity ranging from mining, road building, 
construction, cement factories, stone breaking etc.18 In Jharkhand, land alienation is providing 
                                                 
18 Walter Fernandes, a Jesuit scholar/activist, has memorably said that in post independence, national development and 
tribal deprivation have become synonymous (Fernandes 1992). Adivasis constitute 40 percent of the displaced persons 
owing to developmental projects though their share of the national population is only 8 percent. Their human 
development status is appalling even by Indian standards.  According to the 1991 census, adivasi literacy rate is 23.63 
percent, far lower than the general population (52.21) and less than that of the lower castes (30.6).  The literacy rate 
of rural adivasi women is 12.74 percent.  Adivasis are the poorest social group in the country; in 1987-88, 52.6 
percent were below the poverty line, compared to 33.4 percent for the general population. Adivasis are badly under-
represented in the governmental workforce.  The percentages of scheduled tribes in type A, B, C, and D 
government employment respectively has been 2.89, 2.68, 5.69 and 6.48:  notably a fraction of 8 percent, in upper 
grades (Xaxa 2001). State acquisition of land for development projects has de-recognised corporate rights over land-
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the context for anti-industrialisation movements which affects both individuals and 
communities. It is a recurring grievance in the rural areas of Ranchi district, including the 
Mundari Khuntkatti areas in the Khunti subdivision which have been tackled here. As a retired 
administrator turned activist narrates there are at least five signature scenarios under which land 
is grabbed from adivasis – that is worth recalling here.19  
 
Narratives of land seizure  
 
1st scenario: Outright seizure 
A ‘diku’ (or non-adivasi) zamindar, shopkeeper or moneylender arrives with musclemen to grab 
land. Prior to this, the darogar (sub-inspector of police station) is bribed to ensure that no first 
information report (FIR) is recorded. The policeman takes a bribe from the adivasi to lodge the 
FIR and then records false entries to weaken the victim’s case just in case it should it ever go to 
court. This is reportedly still a common feature in urban areas.  
 
2nd scenario: Extorting illiterates 
 
Cash-strapped adivasis often resort to loans from moneylenders to furnish school fees for 
children or for marriage related expenses etc. Inevitably they have nothing except but land to 
offer as collateral. The moneylender then prepares a receipt / mortgage deed which has three 
possible time-bound variations – a two year loan, a ‘not exceeding five years’ loan and a usufruct 
mortgage not exceeding seven years. The fraud is perpetrated by deliberately not recording the 
date of deed or omitting the deadline for repayment. By omitting the date, the creditor is in a 
position to hold on to the land till the debtor loses his patience, at which point the date can be 
inserted to extend the ‘agreement.’ Section 71A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act empowers 
the Deputy Commissioner to restore land to the adivasi even if he has mortgaged his land, 
provided he applies for restoration of land within three years of the end of the mortgage 
agreement. Many adivasis are unaware of this rule and often end up going after three years even 
if the date is on the agreement. In fact, the moneylender is likely to exploit the traditional links 
with the adivasi (that facilitates the transaction in the first place) by gently evading attempts by 
the latter to repay the loan within three years of the end of the agreement. This would typically 
involve cajoling the adivasi through exaggerated, contrived warmth as in: ‘what’s the hurry, keep 
it, I’ll take it later.’ The Deputy Commissioner often expresses his helplessness to give back the 
land after three years have passed.  
 
3rd scenario:  
 
This involves a diku keeping a tribal concubine who keeps the affair a secret from her family or 
village. He then gives cash to her to go and purchase tribal land in her name. The girl is usually 
caught between an incensed neighbourhood and a man who will not own up to her in his own 
community by marrying her. After a while she pleads with her family to let her go and keep the 
land after which the land moves into the hands of the diku.  
                                                                                                                                                       
based resources on which 15 million Indian adivasis currently depend, snatching between 40 and 80 percent of total 
tribal land resources without compensation (Pathy 1998: 277). 
19  I’m grateful to PNS Surin, retired Additional Magistrate, Bihar Administrative Service, for outlining these 
scenarios that confronts adivasis regularly.  
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4th scenario: 
 
In mining areas, it is common to find adivasi owned land hemmed in by mining activity. It is 
also common to find Mining Corporation of India leasing mining licenses to dikus (e.g. marwaris, 
outsiders). The diku will then start encroaching on adivasi land, cajoling him to mine just a little 
more and periodically providing cash advances not to go to court. Over a period of time, the 
adivasi land is vacated by attrition.  
 
5th scenario: 
 
The Forest Department has taken over vast tracts of zamindari land in Jharkhand and declared it 
as reserved or protected forest. These include Mundari Khuntkatti areas which have never been 
under zamindari control, but the Forest Department, for instance, was giving the impression to a 
World Bank consultation in 2004 that Khuntkatti land too was reserved forest which is untrue.20  
As noted earlier, people’s movements are up against a pro-liberalisation momentum embraced 
by successive regimes in the state. Christian presence in these movements adds another 
dimension to the social conflict in view of Hindu nationalism own cultural agenda that aims to 
‘Hinduise’ tribals. Christian adivasis have been targeted by Hindu nationalists as part of a 
conventional political strategy to stigmatise minority groups and forge a Hinduised constituency 
for its electoral purposes.  
 
Hindu nationalist groups like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
(VHP) and Vanvasi Kalyan Parishad (VKP) have made considerable inroads in Jharkhand, 
backed by state patronage as has been the case since the BJP came to power at the Centre in 
1999. They are, in a sense, mimicking Christian missionary strategies by providing services in the 
fields of education and health. Numerous primary schools have been started by Hindu 
nationalists groups some allegedly using funds from Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan scheme of the 
central government along with requisite infrastructure like buildings, hostels etc. An April 2004 
issue of The Organiser, the premier organ of the Hindu nationalist family of organisations, says 
that the RSS runs 550 Shakhas held in 422 places and that ‘the work of associated organization 
like Vanvasi Kalyan Kendra, VHP, Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarti Parishad (ABVP), Bharatiya 
Mazdoor Sangh, Bharatiya Kisan Sangh and others is very effective. It says the work of Vanvasi 
Kalyan Kendra is strongest as it runs over 1300 projects while the VHP also runs more than 
1000 service projects.21 It has pushed other elements of its cultural agenda through the BJP-led 
coalition government led by Chief Minister Arjun Munda. In August 2006 it attempted to push 
through anti-conversion legislation that is now in force in four (BJP-ruled or allied) states of 
Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Gujarat. (The move was opposed by its coalition 
partner Janata Dal [U].22) The government also passed anti-cow slaughter legislation, one of 
                                                 
20 Interview with PNS Surin, April 2005.  
21  ‘In Jharkhand: Sangh combating missionary menace: Interview with Shreesh Devpujari, prant pracharak of 
Jharkhand (former personal secretary to Raju Bhaiyya, sarsangchalak)’, Organiser, 11 April 2004, p. 13. Also see 
Neena Vyas, ‘RSS has highest stake in Jharkhand’, The Hindu, 23 January 2005.  
22 "There's no question of supporting any BJP move to bring the anti-conversion bill," said Jaleshwar Mahata, head 
of state unit of JD (U). ‘Church happy as Conversion Bill threatens Jharkhand state's coalition government, at 
http://www.theindiancatholic.com/newsread.asp?nid=3187 , posted 31 August 2006.  
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BJP’s pet issues nationwide, while the Chief Minister issued fresh strictures to district 
administrations to ensure strict implementation of the law.23  
 
As said, Christian activism is a key aspect of Jharkhand’s vibrant social movement activism that 
occasionally coincides spatially with the activity of Maoists guerrillas – who are now widely 
recognised as serious security threat by the political leadership and government agencies. 24 
Hindu nationalists have long blamed ‘the Church’ for Jharkhand’s political disorder – be it the 
movement for autonomy that culminated in statehood in 2000 or in assailing it for 
conversionary practices. Maoists and social movement activists operate in the same sphere and 
there is every possibility that state actors and Hindu nationalists tar Christian activism with the 
Maoist brush just as the Church’s ‘linkages’ with militancy in the Northeast were well-advertised.  
 
This study argues, through qualitative inference, that even though the Church as an institution 
(in all its denominational forms) has been unwilling to take up socio-political causes actively, 
Christian activists play a significant and often a leading role in various adivasi social movements 
in contemporary Jharkhand. Several factors have contributed to that possibility. First is the very 
‘tradition of protest’ in Chota Nagpur that has seen several adivasi revolts against colonial rulers 
and local elites since the early 19th century.25 Through institutional building that Church has built 
on that legacy. The educational apparatus of the Church across the state; the actively transmitted 
legacy of Christian political involvement in the movement for autonomy since the late 1930s, the 
persistent attempts by non-tribal outsiders to exploit adivasis provide the context for the 
continuing politicisation of youth that finds expression in the various movements to protect 
adivasi rights. The chronological advantage that Christian adivasis had in acclimatising to forms 
of pan local associational life through Church activity, in accessing missionary education and 
government jobs still holds and helps in current mobilization ventures, as we shall see later. This 
is achieved through a range of informal associations, a feature of Jharkhandi civil society – 
particularly in Ranchi district – that are formed to fight specific struggles such as Jharkhand 
Justice Forum, Koel Karo Jan Sangathan (KKJS), Jharkhand Mines Area Coordination 
Committee (JMACC), Rajmahal Virodhi Andolan etc.  
 
A significant portion of effective mobilization occurs apart from the officially registered NGOs 
thus eluding state legibility and control. There are prominent civil society institutions like the 
Bindrai Institute for Research Study and Action (BIRSA), Indian Confederation of Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples (ICITP), and the Xavier’s Institute of Social Sciences (XISS) to be sure. But 
of particular interest for this study are the networks of Jesuit, Protestant and sarna activists who 
are able to forge protest clusters quickly and coordinate advocacy and mobilization strategies 
                                                 
23 ‘Jharkhand to strictly implement anti-cow slaughter law’, IANS report at  
http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1049293, posted 25 August 2006. The Chief Minister also 
announced plans to make singing of the Vande Mataram compulsory in educational institutions. ‘Jharkhand 
Government to make singing of Vande Mataram mandatory, The Hindustan Times (Delhi), 31 August 2006.  
24 The Union government has recently agreed to allow air support for anti-Naxal operations in six states including 
Jharkhand, a remarkable development for the tribal heartland. Only helicopters have been allowed in the first 
instance; the state government is authorized to hire them from private operators. This does speculatively set the 
stage for future involvement of the Indian Air Force. The announcement followed a flurry of high level meetings to 
discuss Maoist violence, including a meeting of Chief Ministers of affected states convened by the Prime Minister 
and consultations of the Chief Secretaries and police chiefs of 13 states with the Union Home Secretary. See ‘State 
gets copters to fight Naxals’, The Economic Times, 2 September 2006 and ‘PM convenes meeting of Chief Ministers’, 
Times of India, 3 September 2006. For official and provisional data on violence caused by Maoist activity in 
Jharkhand see http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/data_sheets/fatalitiesnaxal.htm .  Also see 
news reports on naxalite activity in Jharkhand see http://www.rediff.com/news/jharkhan.htm  
25 The prominent uprisings include the Kol insurrection of 1831-32, the Santhal revolt of 1855-56, the Sardari Larai 
movement 1858-1890, the millennial movement led by Birsa Munda (1874-1901). 
Sushil J. Aaron  
 
Page 10 
Please note that you are bounded by our conditions of use http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/copyright.htm © LSE 2006 
 
against the state or industrial projects. Importantly, these networks operate beyond the purview 
of the established Church institutions and in opposition to the conservative instincts of the local 
clergy, thus initiating new struggles of authority within Christian communities—in part 
explaining the limited electoral impact of these activists even if they can enlist support for 
political agitations.  
 
A couple of clarifications: When this paper talks of ‘Christian’ activists it merely speaks in an 
ascriptive sense. I am mostly referring to groups of individual Protestant and Catholic activists 
who come together to launch popular agitations. They include politically active students, rural 
activists, Jesuit priests, lay urban professionals involved in social action who pool in their 
resources along with non-Christian sarna adivasis to support, mobilise, or lead adivasi agitations. 
Apart from the rare exception, their activism is not a religiously defined one; it is provoked by 
being politicised through transmission of the discourse of dispossession and the agitational 
climate of modern Jharkhand history.  
 
As noted, Christian social activism does not arguably appear to be religiously defined social 
action. In fact Christian conversion in Chota Nagpur has been arguably characterised by 
relatively poor transmission of religious content, particularly among the Munda tribe. An acute 
awareness of adivasi history and cultural practice supersedes the Christian element in the self-
construction of a Christian adivasi activist particularly. This is not to say that there is no 
awareness of religious differentiation; indeed there is, but pressures from without (i.e. the state 
and dikus [outsiders]) serves to reinforce the discourse of subordination that privileges adivasi 
identity over a sense of religious difference.26 To be sure, the organised Church, as represented 
through the dominant Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Anglican streams, have had an active 
involvement in Chota Nagpur politics since the region found itself caught up in the 
devolutionary struggles that India went through since early 20th century.27 
 
This paper deals with contemporary social movement actors who work through informal or 
semi-informal groupings while tackling various the challenges of adivasi communities. A striking 
feature of social movement activism in Jharkhand is the sheer number of informal associations 
of activists who form a sort of mobile vanguard to support people agitations. These coalitions 
build on or mobilise grassroot support and include activists from various backgrounds: lawyers, 
sarna youth, Jesuits, protestant lay professionals, students and women – all of whom have 
varying levels of involvement in ‘people’s movements.’ Popular movements require different 
layers of actors performing various functions of rallying crowds, coordinate meetings in different 
locations (in forested areas), framing petitions and initiate litigation for short-term relief, 
generate media awareness, solicit support of sympathetic politicians and urban civil society 
professionals who have national and transnational network capital etc. In Jharkhand, civil society 
activism is marked by a remarkable concert of these activists who blend well with village level 
leadership in offering resistance. Some of these actors in the Christian sphere are reviewed here.  
 
                                                 
26 Awareness of religious difference is exacerbated by the cultural prescriptions of churches which will be discussed 
below.  
27 A comprehensive account of this phenomenon is well beyond the scope of this study. This paper does not deal 
with prominent Roman Catholic institutions in Jharkhand like the Jesuit-run Xavier’s Institute of Social Services 
(XISS) whose curriculum in its Masters programs, various developmental programmes in literacy, health and micro-
credit, advocacy in spheres of social justice and political decentralization for many years now, deserve a separate 
extended study. Anirudh Prasad has reviewed the developmental interventions of some organizations in his 
Alleviating Hunger: Challenge for the New Millenium (New Delhi: ISPCK, 2001).  
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This account is not an anthropology of the protest subculture in Jharkhand; its methodological 
limitations have elided themes such as impact of popular agitations on hierarchies among adivasi 
communities (viz. do they reinforce or undermine existing elite structures). How adivasi claims 
to self-rule intersects the issue of gender has also not been addressed. It has restricted itself to 
the political orientation of Christian organisations and activists and demonstrated its 
involvement in a range of social movement settings – from popular agitations fighting against 
displacement caused by investment-friendly climate to evolving constructions of tribal identity in 
order to secure adivasi interests in the recently-created state and mobilising support to arrest the 
Hindu nationalist agenda.  
This study is based on a four week field trip (in September 2004 and March-April 2005) in 
Ranchi district conducting interviews with Christian clergy from the three main 
denominations— the Roman Catholic Church, Gossner Evangelical Lutheran Church (GELC) 
and the Church of North India. Other interlocutors included Christian and non-Christian adivasi 
activists in two prominent ongoing agitations (against the Netarhat Field Firing Pilot Project and 
the Koel Karo Hydroelectric Power Project); Jesuits priests involved in these movements 
besides political activists and village leaders in Ranchi city and the south/south-western part of 
Ranchi district, which has a significant Christian concentration of mostly Munda adivasis.28 
Before progressing further, a digression on Christianity in modern Chota Nagpur history is 
perhaps in order to situate contemporary modes of activism. 
 
Christianity in Chota Nagpur history 
 
Historically, Christianity has had a greater impact on Chota Nagpur than its current level of 
adherents (4.05 percent of Jharkhand’s population) would suggest. Like some of its other 
encounters in India, in the case of the abolition of sati or tackling the improvidence of 
‘depressed castes’ or peasant cultivators in Bengal, missionary Christianity found itself assuming 
extra evangelical concerns after arriving with implacable confidence in the inexorable power of 
itinerant preaching. When the first four German missionaries sent by the Lutheran Mission 
arrived in 1845, Chota Nagpur was experiencing the alternating throes of episodic adivasi revolts 
and fervent pacification attempts by the British. This had much to do with the alienation of 
adivasi land through the effect of the Permanent Settlement of 1793, which usurped the 
communal ownership of adivasi land and forested areas. To be sure, non-tribal groups that were 
to ultimately effect the dispossession of land were already living in the area. Since 1628 the tribal 
chieftain gradually granted service-grants (jagirs) of land to caste Hindu non-tribals that allowed 
outsiders to collect tax from adivasi inhabitants. But land alienation quickened following colonial 
ingress.  
 
Prior to colonial entry the tribal chieftain (raja) only had nominal control over the adivasis who 
paid him nominal annual tribute through a Munda manki, a nominal head of a group of Munda 
tribal headmen of 10-12 villages in a loose confederation collective called the parha. The jagirs 
created a landlord class who disrupted existing traditional forms of Bhuinhari and Khuntkatti land 
tenancy which customarily belonged to heirs of the original clearers of the agricultural lands i.e. 
founders of the villages who held customary ownership of ‘the villages, all lands arable as well as 
                                                 
28 Places visited include Khunti, Murhu, Ulihatu, Marangada, and Soyko which lie off the Ranchi-Chaibasa road. 
Interviews were also conducted in villages in the proposed displacement area of the Karo region starting at Torpa 
on the Ranchi-Simdega route and proceeding upward to Tapkara, Derang and Loajimi. The region between 
Chainpur to Mahuadanr to the west of Ranchi in Gumla district is another area of Christian concentration 
consisting mostly of Oraons. In the Santhal Parganas, Dumka and its adjoining areas have a sizeable Christian 
presence.  
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waste, including forests and other resources belonging to them.’ The Mundari Khuntkatti 
tenancy, for instance, was not assessable for rent, the tenant paid chanda (tribute) for the 
occupation of their territory while the Bhunihari tenures (held principally in Oraon areas) were 
held by the adivasi on perpetual fixed rents which were not customarily enhanced.29 Surin points 
out that the Khuntkattidars and Bhuinhardars were ‘much superior classes of tenants than 
ordinary raiyats’ as commonly presumed probably by caste Hindus who assumed control of 
jagirs. The landlords were likely to argue the raja controlled the land and had lawfully ceded it to 
them (Clarysse 1985: 96) although British officials attest that ‘Hindu landlords and middlemen 
had always recognized the rights of the descendants of the original clearers of the villages to 
hold certain lands called bhuinhari either rent free or at a quit rent.’30 
 
The Permanent Settlement lent lethal legal ballast for the encroaching instincts of ‘outsiders’ 
built as it was around a presumption of zamindari ownership of land and emphasising proven 
record of ownership that was simply unavailable to (or needed for) the unlettered adivasis. The 
ability to tax the adivasis inevitably now assumed oppressive dimensions leading to cycles of 
debt, further land alienation and the introduction of beth-begari (forced labour). Landlords were 
known to demand 60-84 days of unpaid labour annually as opposed to the customary 14-15 
days, adivasis were denied receipts for rent given, enabling them to demand rents two to three 
times over. 31  An oft-quoted passage from an 1869 article in the Calcutta Review eloquently 
captures the plight of the adivasis, who were known as the Kols: 
 
When the oppressor wants a horse, the Kol must pay; when he desires a palki (palanquin), the 
Kols have to pay and afterwards to bear him therein. They must pay for his musicians, for his 
milch cows, for his paan [betel nut mixture]. Does some die in his house? He taxes them. Is a 
child born? Again a tax. Is there a marriage or Puja? A tax. Is the thikadar found guilty at cutchary 
[court] and sentenced to be punished? The Kol must pay the fine. Or does a death occur in the 
house of the Kol. The poor man must pay a fine. This plundering, punishing and robbing system 
goes on till the Kols run away.32 
 
Lutheran missionaries arrived in 1845 after the effects of Kol insurrection of 1831, that was 
termed ‘a gesture of despair’ in a ‘crude form of protest’ against land alienation which saw the 
British take on more direct control of the area through the creation of South West Frontier 
Agency. Tribal dispossession continued apace that was to provide the principal context for 
conversion to Christianity. They gained their first converts only five years and rapidly attracted 
adivasi interest owing to the assistance the missionaries offered in resisting the landlords and 
offering legal help. A British official writes that ‘work amongst aboriginals has always been a 
favourite field for missionary enterprise, and in Ranchi the conditions were exceptionally 
favourable. The population was backward, uncivilized, and illiterate; agrarian strife was rife, and 
                                                 
29 For an extended treatment of the impact of colonial rule on adivasi land alienation and impact of Christian 
missionaries (passim), see Romila Thapar, and Majeed H. Siddiqi (1979), ‘Chota Nagpur: The Precolonial and 
Colonial Situation’, in UNESCO (ed.), Trends in Ethnic Group Relations in Asia and Oceania. Reprinted in (2003) 
in R. D. Munda and S. B. Mullick, The Jharkhand Movement: Indigenous Peoples’ Struggle for Autonomy in India, Chaibasa: 
Bindrai Institute for Research Study and Action, 31-72. PNS Surin, ‘Status of Land among the tribal communities in 
Jharkhand’, Jharkhand Journal of Development and Management Studies, Vol.1, November 2002, p. 59.  
30  J. Reid, Final Report on the Survey and Settlement Operations in the District of Ranchi, 1902-1910 (Calcutta: Bengal 
Secretariat Book Depot, 1912), p. 34.  
31 L. Clarysse, S.J., Father Constant Lievens, S.J., (Ranchi: Satyabharati, 1985), p. 102. 
32
 ‘The Kols, the Insurrection of 1882 and the Land Tenure Act of 1869’ Art. 1, Calcutta Review, Vol. 49, 1869, pp. 
109-158, cited in Alexius Ekka, ‘Hundred Years of the Christian Missions in Chotanagpur’, Indian Church History 
Review, Vol. 33, 1999, p. 80.  
. 
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spread of Christianity has gone hand in hand with the efforts of the aboriginals to resist the 
oppression of the landlords and to assert, and secure recognition for, their claims to the lands on 
which they were first settlers.’33  
 
German missionaries were presumed to be linked to colonial officials and conversion was 
deemed to be a perfunctory religious prelude to the recovery of lands. Thus the conversionary 
trajectory of adivasis in Chota Nagpur appears to have little in common with those in Northeast 
India where Christian cosmology attracted a section of converts even as mass conversions were 
taking place.34 In Chota Nagpur conversion was a social exchange between evangelicals keen on 
filing flattering missionary reports and adivasis aspiring for the tenurial ‘record of rights.’ A GEL 
Mission report in 1869 sums it up:  
 
It is a sad but very telling fact that the missionary on his district tours is not so much received 
because he has come to inquire into the spiritual condition of the people but because he is 
expected to assist them in regaining their land, and in freeing them from the oppression of the 
Thikadars. The shew (sic) generally speaking, no great desire to hear the word of God: ‘give us 
our land; free us from the Thikadar; procure us release from our begar’, such are the cries which 
meet the missionary everywhere, and he finds it very often extraordinarily difficult to convince 
the people that he is entirely unable to assist them in their difficulties.35 
 
The 1911 Census quotes a Roman Catholic missionary regarding the ‘inducements for 
conversion’:  
 
As a general rule religious motives are out of the question. They want protection against 
zamindari and police extortions and assistance in the endless litigation forced on them by 
zamindars. As a consequence – most of the converts came over (after panchayats) in whole 
villages or in groups of villages; a certain number of isolated families came over, either for help 
against zamindars or police extortion, or against the rest of their co-villagers who persecuted 
them because they were pointed out by the Sokhas as wizards or witches. Personally I know of 
some cases where individuals came over from religious motives. But these cases are rare.36 
 
Hallett relates that ‘enquirers no longer came by two or threes, but whole families, and in some 
cases whole villages, applied eagerly for baptism. On one day in November 1864 no less than six 
hundred men, women and children presented themselves.’37 This pattern continued for at least 
50 years. In 1890 there were 35,000 Christians in Chota Nagpur, which doubled in a decade by 
1901. By 1913 there were 96,543 Christians, of which more than 73000 were from Ranchi 
comprising of 37,000 Mundas, over 30,000 Oraons and over 6000 Kharias.38  
                                                 
33 M. G. Hallett, ‘Missions’ Bihar and Orissa District Gazetteers: Ranchi (Patna: Superintendent, Government Printing, 
Bihar and Orissa, 1917), p. 224. 
34 Richard M. Eaton (1984, "Conversion to Christianity among the Nagas, 1876-1971," Indian Economic and Social 
History Review, Vol. 11, no. 1, 1-43.  
35 J. C. Jerome, The Chota Nagpore Mission: Its History and Present Position (Calcutta: 1870), p.12 cited in Amit M. Ghose, 
Christian Missions in Chotanagpur: A Study of Missionary Activities among the Mundas and Oraons of Ranchi 1845-1910. M. 
Phil dissertation, Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1990, p. 68.  
36 Census of India, 1911, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 138.  
37 M. G. Hallett, ‘Missions’, Bihar and Orissa District Gazetteers: Ranchi (Patna: Superintendent, Government 
Printing, Bihar and Orissa, 1917), p. 226.  
38 Hallett, op. cit., pp. 229-230. Alexius Ekka citing denominational sources arrives at different figures. ‘There were 
about 33,000 native Lutheran believers by 1886, 10600 Anglicans by 1880 and 35,789 Catholics in Barway alone by 
1891 in a span of two years of missionary work by Lievens, and a total Catholic population of 70,000 by 1890 in 
Chotanagpur.’ Ekka, op. cit., p. 84.  
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Denominational location of Christians depended on the extent of help offered or rendered by 
the three main Churches namely, the Lutheran, the Roman Catholics and the Anglican SPG 
mission. Defections were reportedly ‘rampant’ between 1845-1910 owing to such considerations. 
During 1881-1891 nearly 1000 Anglicans switched to Roman Catholicism while Lutherans 
gained 4000 converts.39 The SPG preferred to steer clear of the land question by virtue of its 
links with the Church of England establishment that effectively made it subject to official 
control. ‘Consequently, they were numerically the smaller church in Chota Nagpur in the period 
between 1845-1910. There were 1901 converts for the Anglican Church as compared to 54000 
for the Roman Catholics, 40 the latter principally through the legal advocacy and representation 
of the Belgian Jesuit Fr. Constant Lievens. Interestingly, Christianity did not make a dent among 
the Ho tribe living in adjoining Orissa which lived in a protected reservation and thus had a 
markedly less incidence of land alienation.  
 
Contemporary Christians are under no illusion about the instrumental nature of accession of 
their forbearers to the Christian faith.41 Manohar Munda, an 86 year old Khuntkattidar from 
Marangadha, recalls that six Munda Manki villages near his home converted to Christianity after 
a Catholic priest demanded conversion saying ‘if you want to save your land convert’. The priest 
first helped them in settling the level of tax with the zamindars at Rs. 300 per annum. However, 
a disgruntled second wife of a khuntkattidar stole the money which provoked the zamindar to 
forcibly seize the lands. The priests then approached the authorities at Ranchi and elicited an 
agreement for a fresh survey of the region which dragged on for many years. But the adivasis 
remained Christians, with virtually no religious instructions, since they had ‘given their word to 
the padres’ (priests).42 
 
The nature of Christian belief or the level of ‘Christianisation’ in Chota Nagpur is relevant to 
understand the political stance of its current adherents. The transmission of Christian belief 
among the first generation of adivasi converts was not uncommon to accounts of mass 
conversions among of the untouchable castes in Andhra and Tamil Nadu – in that they were 
mass conversions geared to achieve a pressing social objective and thus not grounded on 
perceived truth claims of the Christian faith. However adivasis thereon did not follow the 
trajectory of south Indian untouchable castes that appropriated a religious fervour which has not 
only continued since but governed the nature of political commitments of those south Indian 
Christians. As with other scholars before him Virginius Xaxa posits the organic view of caste 
society with the segmentary nature of tribal communities to explain why tribals suffer in 
comparison with dalits who have received affirmative action benefits. This may well be useful in 
explaining the different outcome of Christian conversion and engagement. The organic view of 
caste says that the dalits were subjected to inhuman treatment by virtue of being outcastes, but at 
least they were integral to the economy of the upper castes serving them in various capacities 
                                                 
39 Ghose, op. cit., p. 90. 
40 Imperial Gazetteer of India (Oxford: 1908), Vol. XXI, p. 204, cited in Ghose, op. cit., p. 73.  
41 Oral transmission of memory seems particularly strong in Jharkhand, possibly due to the sequence of agrarian 
upsurges since the 19th century, from the 1831 Kol insurrection through to the 1900 Birsa revolt, that play a crucial 
role in framing contemporary adivasi identity. Having lived through a period of intense political ferment since the 
19th century, characterised by loss of land, consistent struggles against the dikus, dealing with inadequate survey and 
settlement operations, the (occasionally) euphoric nature of the Jharkhand movement and facing the constant 
ingress of the postcolonial Indian state has conveyed a firm awareness of both local and regional history. Thus older 
adivasi activists are able to particularly recall the history of local land surveys in the 19th century and the Jharkhand 
movement of the Jaipal Singh era with relative ease.  
42 Manohar Munda, interview, April 2005.  
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and interacting with them daily, despite their segregated inhabitation. In the course of time 
therefore ‘opportunities made available to the larger societies or the higher castes in the form of 
knowledge, information, technology, employment, etc, were also in sight for the scheduled 
castes, even though they were denied access to it.’ The tribes, by contrast, he says, live in self 
contained communities with restricted commerce and thus suffered the disadvantage of 
isolation.43  
 
The isolation argument has now fallen into some disrepute to explain the absence of social 
change among tribals, but in the case of Chota Nagpur, one can argue at least that the cultural 
context to appropriate religious faith which existed in south India, in the face of an upper-caste 
intellectual revivalist backlash that contested the need for religious conversion, did not exist. 
Christian conversion in south India was also culturally destabilising in addition to unsettling 
power relations in tangible terms; in Chota Nagpur this wasn’t arguably so.44 It remained for 
most part a trade off between recovery of land and entries in church registers even as a section 
of adivasis attained firmer religious grounding. This was particularly the case with the Mundas of 
southern Ranchi. The Oraons by comparison who had a different system of bhuinhari land 
tenure (that allowed individual families to own land) facilitated a greater appropriation of faith. 
Christian missions either helped them recover individual entitlement to land or education 
became a way to substitute for loss of land; both creating the context for a more structured 
transmission of faith for a section of the Oraon community that still continues. But this too was 
by no means pervasive even among the Oraons.  
 
For the Mundas of southern Ranchi though, as for much of Chota Nagpur, institutional contact 
with Christianity impaired religious transmission. As a result in Chota Nagpur at large, 
Christianity did not replicate the mass evangelical revivals among Christians in south India since 
the 1950s that was to a significant extent sustained by Western evangelical interest and financial 
support.45 Although this has to be empirically established, one can posit that the political context 
of Chota Nagpur hampered the transition to an individualist, quiescent faith that is a feature of a 
large section of south Indian Christianity. All of this hindered a Weberian momentum that might 
have created a larger self-absorbed middle class than what turned out through job reservations in 
public sector jobs since the 1950s. Christian belief and organisation in Chota Nagpur was not 
able to dislodge adivasi attachment to land, at least among the Mundas of Ranchi district, thus 
ensuring their intensive involvement in political movements. 
 
 
Christianity and the discourse of protest 
 
Christianity however had a role in framing the discourse of adivasi protest. Colonial 
administrators constructed the category of ‘tribe’ to introduce distinctive regimes of governance 
in order to extract forestry and mineral resources in ‘frontier’ or ‘agency’ or reservation areas 
                                                 
43 Virginus Xaxa, “Protective Discrimination: Why Scheduled Tribes lag behind Scheduled Castes,” Economic and 
Political Weekly, 21 July 2001, from www.epw.org.in , accessed on 11 October 2001.  
44 For instance, the processes of ‘cultural change’ wrought by the conversion of untouchable communities in south 
India such as Shanars, Pariahs and Pulayas, punctuated with debates over ‘sanskritisation’, vegetarianism, mostly in 
response to the urgent need to clarify Christian identity in the face of upper caste reaction, did not replicate itself in 
Chotanagpur. See Dick Kooiman, Conversion and Social Equality in India: The Church Missionary Society in South Travancore 
in the 19th Century (New Delhi: Manohar, 1989), pp. 202-203.  
45 Lionel Caplan, “Popular Christianity in Urban South India,” Religion and Society, Vol. XXX, No. 2, 1983, pp. 28-44.  
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which later came in handy to keep out nationalist interest. Since the second half of the 19th 
century the elements of this ideology of tribal difference featured an ethnography of 
primitiveness, distinct social organisation, religious belief and economic behaviour. This much is 
well-attested. But the missionary role in disseminating an articulated ideology of difference on a 
popular plane among adivasis while attempting to secure their interests in land is less well-
advertised.  
 
There was, to be sure, a sharp pre-existent awareness of their rights that continually provoked 
agrarian upsurges. But the persistent stream of petitionary advocacy by missionaries, the mass 
contact with adivasis that that entailed coupled with the codification of tribal cultures by 
missionary anthropologists like J. B. Hoffmann – author of the multi-volume treatise 
Encyclopaedia Mundarica, and a much relied on consultant, if you will, for British administrators 
whilst preparing Land Survey settlements – played a crucial role in radiating the articulated 
ideology of difference and subordination among adivasis that was to be central to the political 
rhetoric of later Chota Nagpur politicians. 46  Missionaries thus had a significant say in the 
epistemic career of the ‘tribe’ that has been usefully deployed by adivasi politicians.  
 
Apart from this ideological function, the missionaries were able to create an active associational 
life through institutional building. Notwithstanding the absence of religious fervour to begin 
with, Christian missions went about establishing an impressive network of schools and health 
facilities to consolidate linkages with their adherents.47 The combination of Christian mainstream 
schools, vocational training centres and health facilities in urban and semi-urban areas 
undermined the sense of spatial isolation that rural adivasi communities experienced. The GEL 
Mission established cooperative credit banks. The Catholics were a lot more organised in this 
respect, with the creation of the Catholic Cooperative Credit Society by Fr. J. B. Hoffmann in 
1909 with the purpose of encouraging thrift among tribal people. ‘It is a farmers’ Cooperative 
with as many Circles as the number of parishes in the old Ranchi Archdiocese, each parish 
having many rural units, often one unit per village… all tribal Catholic households of a village 
are entitled to become its members, who become joint guarantors when any one of them takes a 
loan from the Cooperative. Over the years it has protected the tribals from the nefarious 
activities of the moneylenders and has supported many a tribal youth in pursuing their higher 
studies, besides offering credit to the farmers on comfortable terms.’48 Informants relate that it is 
very common for parishes to conduct a bank meeting soon after the Catholic Mass is solemnised 
each Sunday. Of course authority over the Credit Society gives Roman Catholic priests a great 
                                                 
46 See Peter Tete, A Missionary Social Worker in India: Fr. J. B. Hoffman, the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act and the Catholic Co-
operatives 1893-1928 (Rome: Universita Gregorina Editrice, 1984). 
47 The first school, Bethesda Girls School, Ranchi, was started in 1851 followed by St. Paul’s Boys School and St. 
Margaret Girls School, Ranchi in 1869. The other prominent institutions include St. John’s Boys School, Ranchi in 
1887, St. Columba’s College, Hazaribagh in 1899, and Ursuline Girls School, Ranchi in 1903. Girls education was a 
specific area of interest for the missionaries. There were two vocational schools for lace work in Ranchi and Khunti 
besides formal educational centers opened at Tongon (1907) and Rengarih (1909) in addition to various primary and 
middle schools in both English and vernacular medium. The other schools of note for Ekka include St. Margaret 
Women’s Training School Ranchi (Catholic; 1909), SPG Teachers Training School (for men; 1904), Bethsaida 
Women’s Training School Ranchi (Lutheran; 1948), Ursuline Convent Girls Training School Lohardaga (1914), 
Teachers’ Training School Noatoli (1912), Teachers Training Institute Sitagarha Hazaribagh (1950). Protestant 
groups took the lead in establishing health facilities. The Dublin University Mission started the St. Columba’s 
Hospital, Hazaribagh; the SPG established hospitals in Ranchi, Murhu and Itki; the Methodist Mission and the CMS 
opened hospitals in Pakur (1926) and Hiranpur (1929) while the Catholics opened their first hospital in Mandar in 
1947. The SPG also opened Leprosy Hospitals in Purulia and Lohardugga. See Ekka, pp. 85-87.  
48 By 1998, the Cooperative had 62,268 members, handing out a total credit of £147,123 with total assets amounting 
to £1,733,920. Ekka, p. 89.  
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deal of control over congregational affairs, but historically initiatives like this arguably forged a 
more structured associational life than the episodic ulgulans (uprisings) that were a feature of 
adivasi resistance and enabled the tribals to acclimatise to urban locales that would become 
crucial as the heyday of nationalist politics approached.  
 
Amit Ghose summarises the role of mission succinctly:  
 
Missionaries functioned according to a well-chalked out programme in the tribal areas of CNP. 
They produced an ideology for the peasant system emerging in the tribal region and grafted the 
notion of private property in land to the communal mode of production; articulated the 
demands of tribals as peasant proprietors for the restoration of land, regulation of rent, and 
abolition of feudal dues; guided peasant struggles against Zamindars of CNP; worked for the 
passage of agrarian law and set up peasant organisations like cooperative credit societies. In fact, 
they gave a new sense of self-respect to the tribal peasants and sought to create a separate 
identity for them.49  
 
Importantly, for the purpose of the future Christian mission thus offered (literally) a useful 
institutional canopy over an area seething with adivasi discontent and helped usher in the 
associational density that was a feature of adivasi mobilisation in the early 20th century. Its 
student hostels became sites for political mobilisation and soon numerous associations were 
formed to raise funds for educating adivasis and fight diku oppression like the Christian 
Association in 1898 by Lutheran graduates, Christian Students Organisation in 1912, Chota 
Nagpur Charitable Association in 1912, Chota Nagpur Unnati Samaj in 1915. These were mostly 
the initiatives of Lutheran and Anglican youth leaders and were followed by the Catholics who 
formed the Catholic Sabha in 1935.  
 
Vidyarthi and Sahay trace the rise of the Jharkhand movement to the efforts of J. Bartholomen, 
‘a young orphan’ from Chaibasa who was raised by the Anglican missionaries. Moved by a sense 
of duty to fellow tribals and inspired by the example of Dacca Students Union whose 
conferences he attended, Bartholomen started mobilising educated youth and organised 
successful fund raising events involved Anglican and Lutheran congregations in Ranchi. He 
eventually started a branch of the Dacca Students Union in Ranchi under the ‘supervision’ of 
Peter Hayward.50 This students’ organisation emerged in 1916 as the Chotanagpur Unnati Samaj 
(trans. Improvement Society), whose members were ‘mostly Christian tribals’ from the Lutheran 
and Anglican congregations. It was led Joel Lakra and its active members included Theble 
Oraon, Bandi Oraon, Paul Dayal etc. (Vidyarthi and Sahay 1978: 86-87). The aim of the Unnati 
Samaj (CNUS) was to ‘uplift Chotanagpur from the present backward state’ and ‘to improve the 
social, political and economic conditions of the tribals.’  
 
The CNUS’ prominence in adivasi mobilization was acknowledged when the Simon 
Commission held consultations with its leadership in 1928. Till it was merged into the Adivasi 
Mahasabha in 1938, the ‘Unnati Samaj embodied an interdenominational unity of the Missions 
for political purposes. It was led by tribal teachers and catechists and sought to secure 
employment for educated tribals, reservation in the services and legislative bodies’ (Ekka 1999: 
                                                 
49 Amit Ghose, Christian Missions in Chotanagpur: A Study of Missionary Activities among the Mundas and Oraons of Ranchi 
1845-1910, M. Phil dissertation, Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1990, p.97. 
50 Vidyarthi and Sahay do not elaborate on Bartholomen’s future; he is simply said to have been active in the 
movement for a while, ‘but just when his efforts were about to blossom, he was thrown out of the scene.’ See L. P. 
Vidyarthi, and K. N. Sahay (1978), The Dynamics of Tribal Leadership in Bihar, Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, pp. 85-86.  
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92). It was through the unifying efforts of Ignace Beck51, a Catholic politician, that all these 
associations merged to become the Adibasi Mahasabha – which was to start the movement for a 
separate state for tribals through its later avatar, the Jharkhand Party, in opposition to the 
Congress whose politicians like Rajendra Prasad were unsympathetic to the tribals. Attracting 
enormous support among the adivasis, the Jharkhand Party, under the leadership of the popular 
Jaipal Singh, became the leading opposition party in the first post independent Bihar Legislature 
in 1952 and repeated its success in 1957 and gradually went into decline after merging with the 
Congress in 1963. 
 
Anglican missionary correspondence reflects the importance of Christian politicians in initiating 
the autonomy movement. The then Bishop of Chotanagpur writing to the Missionary Council in 
1940 reports:  
 
We have indeed been confronted with a novel situation this year, owing to the fact that the 
aboriginals have organized themselves into a political association – the adibasi sabha – and have 
thereby come into conflict with the supporters of the congress party. This has not been 
altogether favourable to the work of the evangelization as zeal for the spread of the gospel has 
tended to be swamped by a flood of political feeling. Christians have played a leading part in the 
movement, as there is a much higher level of education among them than among non-Christian 
aboriginal and the Congress government, always sensitive to opposition, has retaliated by various 
acts of discrimination against Christians.52  
 
A Diocesan report nine years later says:  
 
Many of the leaders are drawn from the ranks of the Christians, but those who attained most 
prominence among them are distinguished rather for a certain demagogic capacity rather than 
for the consistency of their Christian example. It is perhaps inevitable that the Christian elements 
among the aboriginals should be politically more vocal than their non-Christian neighbours as 
owing to the higher percentage of literates among them they are a good deal less backward than 
the latter.53  
 
Evidently even the nationalist Congress viewed the movement as Christian and Church-led. The 
diocesan report cautions the mission against alluding to the political situation in Chota Nagpur: 
 
If you should allude to the political situation here, please be most careful to say anything 
derogatory to the Congress government, as they are very resentful of criticism: all three missions, 
Roman, Anglican and Lutheran have officially pursued a policy of strict neutrality, insisting on 
                                                 
51 Beck become an MP in the 1935 elections and was quickly disillusioned by Congress seriousness about tribal 
issues and expressed an attraction toward ‘ethnic separatism’ of Jinnah and attempted to unify all Christians under 
one platform. He faced opposition from his own Catholic Sabha’s priests and laymen but managed to get other 
leaders on board for a unified front for elections to the Ranchi Municipal elections which Beck’s alliance won 
resoundingly. Beck’s alliance called for the separate state for Chotanagpur under the rubric of Chotanagpur Adibasi 
Mahasabha. (‘no future for adivasis so long as they are ruled by non-tribals.’). See Vidyarthi and Sahay, p. 89.  
52 George Noel Lankester Hall, Bishop of Chotanagpur, to Canon John Mcleod Campbell, General Secretary of the 
Missionary Council of the Church Assembly. Dated 2 February 1940, Diocesan Reports 1937-52, MSS 3127 115 at 
Lambeth Palace Library (LPL), London  
53 Diocesan Report, letter to Canon John Mcleod Campbell, 29 May 1949, MSS 3127, 143-144. 
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the supernatural mission of the church and its superiority to all racial prejudices. We have 
continued to cooperate with the Congress campaigns for the promotion of the spread of literacy 
and temperances.54  
 
The report also says that in September 1947 ‘the heads of the three churches –Roman Catholic, 
Lutherans and Anglican – were served with a peremptory order to abstain from meddling in 
politics and the missionaries were publicly accused of fomenting the agitation both on the 
platform and in the newspapers controlled by the Congress Party.’55 (This is not to suggest that 
Christians were solely responsible in the agitation for securing adivasi rights, but to merely say 
that organised Christianity provided the institutional impetus for educated Christians to emerge 
and build on an established tradition of protest in the 19th century.)  
 
Christian politicians subsequently, however, lost appeal for a variety of reasons: They were 
predominantly drawn from urban educated classes and did not have an agrarian agenda that 
were assuming greater urgency, particularly in the Santal Parganas, as more and more land was 
being taken up for development projects with appalling rehabilitation packages that led to the 
rise of the Shibu Soren’s JMM. There were other structural factors at play as Stuart Corbridge 
has pointed out. Adivasi communities were internally differentiated on class lines and 
ethnoregionalism had to come to terms with the fact that the adivasis were in fact a minority and 
thereby had to co-opt non-tribals into the movement that affected its prospects.  
 
Political outlook of mainline churches, Jesuits and ‘ordinary Christians’ 
 
The ‘mainline’ churches represented by Lutherans, Anglicans and Catholics, meanwhile, had 
varying political instincts towards the movement for statehood, while pursuing staple initiatives 
in the spheres of education, health, culture and economy. This has partly to do with the 
organizational character and the political status of religious authorities. On a broad plane, 
Catholics distinguished themselves since the late 19th century in campaigning for land rights and 
educating adivasis. The Anglicans, initially a breakaway group of the Lutherans, with close links 
to the colonial regime, restricted themselves to educational and health related efforts, the 
translation of scriptures etc. and refrained from political involvement. The Lutherans were a lot 
more politically active. They had a significant following among the Mundas of Ranchi district 
and sported a looser organisational structure since World War I when the German missionaries 
had to return home, thus fast-tracking the leadership handover to local adivasis. The prominence 
of Munda politicians in Chota Nagpur allowed them to hold sway over the political outlook of 
the Lutheran Church; in fact politicians like NE Horo held a prominent layman’s post in the 
GEL hierarchy for years.56  
 
The Catholic leadership was nowhere as politically robust in the pre-independence phase as the 
GEL in endorsing the laity’s political interests. The top down character of Catholic hierarchy 
plus the fact that the leadership was predominantly Belgian in a British colony led to a restrained 
political stance preventing them from actively endorsing the activism of its adherents. In his 
memoirs, the Catholic politician Ignace Beck notes that the both GEL mission and the Anglican 
                                                 
54 Hall to McLeod, op. cit., MSS 3127, 115.  
55 Diocesan Report, op. cit., MSS 3127, 143-144. 
56  Horo’s residence in Ranchi, behind GEL College, is one reportedly accorded to him by virtue of being a 
‘secretary’ of the GEL Church.  
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Church did not prevent the laity from being part of political associations like the Unnati Samaj 
but ‘any Catholic enrolling himself as a member or occupying an Executive post in the Samaj 
was ostracized’.57 But eventually, to counteract the appeal of the Unnati Samaj and enlist the 
support of Catholic laymen who were discreetly joining the CNUS, the Catholic Church started 
the Chotanagpur Catholic Sabha in 1932-33. It had a non-political charter but it strove to ‘tender 
advice to Government on matters relating to adivasis’ interests.’ 58  As devolutionary politics 
kicked in the Catholic Church’s political drives were mostly emulative in character, keen on 
preserving a Catholic niche in self-governing arrangements. After independence, the Catholic 
Church leaned toward the Congress rather than openly favour the pro-Jharkhand parties. 
 
The Catholic establishment has since expressed greater interest in politics. The current Cardinal 
Telesphore Toppo is known for his anti-Hindu nationalist posturing and criticism of 
governmental ‘interference’ in religious affairs. There are a number of Catholic organisations 
which are associated with social causes. At least one Catholic priest went so far as to contest 
contesting the 2005 legislative assembly election and was suspended by the Bishop.59  
 
However, interlocutors draw a distinction between rhetorical posturing of urban-based religious 
leadership and the cautious approach of clergy in the countryside. The hierarchical structure of 
the Catholic Church also works against open participation in causes led by non-observant laity 
or sarna activists. Parish priests are used to a fair degree of control over congregations, by virtue 
of institutional authority over schools, hospital and the local chapters of the cooperative credit 
society, making them unlikely to join in struggles they cannot lead or control. This is particularly 
the case with junior and middle ranking priests with local adivasi roots who presume to be or are 
perceived as alternative power centre for social movements, leading to a fitful relationship with 
popular struggles.60 
 
The Jesuits, however, are different. They provide key low-radar support to many people’s 
movements through informal advice, drawing attention of community leaders to legal matters, 
gazette notifications, policy documents etc, raising awareness by conducting meetings in villages, 
coordinating the work of activists in different areas, printing and disseminating primers on 
specific issues in the vernacular for eliciting popular support and so on. What lends them trans-
Christian appeal in Jharkhand is the distance they maintain from the Catholic establishment, 
literally and substantively. Jesuits assigned to work in justice-related issues do not live in Catholic 
enclaves and often take up causes that are at variance with the conserving instincts of the clergy.  
 
Also certain sections of Indian Jesuits have a noticeable attraction for Marxism and wish to 
translate social analysis into mobilizational energy. In fact Jesuit activism across India pointedly 
avoids deploying religious idioms for fear of alienating non-Christian audiences. This has been a 
feature of prominent Jesuits involved in social action, particularly those involved with the Indian 
                                                 
57 Ignace Beck, Political Awakening of Tribals in Jharkhand: A Historical Perspective, New Delhi: Sinagi Dei Publications, 
2002, p.8. 
58 They included activities such as ‘(1) Advice given to government when Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas 
were formed in Jharkhand, (2) Memorandum to the States Reorganisation Commission demanding a separate 
Jharkhand State, (3) Memorandum presented to the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes Commission.’ ibid., p. 
10. 
59 ‘Catholic priest in the fray’, The Tribune, 11 February 2005 and ‘Jharkhand Bishop suspends priest for contesting 
election’, at http://www.catholiccambodia.org/en/read/179 , posted 14 February 2005.  
60
 Interviews with activists, Ranchi, April 2005. 
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Social Institute (ISI), New Delhi. The writings of recent directors of the institute like Fr. Stan 
Lourdusamy, Fr. Walter Fernandes, Fr. Ambrose Pinto, and Fr. Prakash Louis reflect an affinity 
to Marxian categories, to the virtual exclusion of religious idiom in their writing or activism.61 
Such a secularised orientation plus an acutely relativistic view of Indian cultural practices has 
enabled Jesuits to forge strong bonds with non-Christian civil society all over India. In 
Jharkhand, Jesuits like the late Fr. Mathew Areeparampil who worked in West Singhbhum are 
well-known social activists. They have forged successful links with other activists and village 
communities partly due to the resources they offer and irreligious baggage they come with. In 
fact, they are known to refuse requests by observant adivasis to pray publicly when on campaign 
visits, stating clearly that they come as social workers not as religious functionaries.62 That a few 
prominent Jesuits are not from Jharkhand affords them a manoeuvrability that local priests 
might not have. Their functional agnosticism is useful in mediating cultural tensions that may 
arise between Christian and sarna activists as will be discussed later. One important initiative that 
the Jesuits facilitate is the Jharkhand Justice Forum, composed of 30 activists featuring six 
retired judges of the High Court, 12 lawyers working at either the High Court or district courts, 
and other prominent social activists. They provide free legal representation for adivasis waging 
court battles to recover land or seeking compensation for displacement etc. They are particularly 
active in raising awareness about the powers of the gram sabha as instituted by the Panchayat 
Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act 1996, as will be reviewed below.63  
 
One caveat at this stage is perhaps in order. Notwithstanding the density of Christian 
associations in Jharkhand and the (uneven) involvement of mainline Churches in politics, the 
latter have not managed to forge a united Christian vote owing to poor electoral coordination 
between the three denominations. An All Churches Coordination Committee was formed in 
December 1998 ostensibly to forge unity in the face of Hindu nationalist assertion. Composed 
of all denominations, its desired objectives are to promote communal harmony and foster unity 
between Christian and sarna adivasis. But it is yet to translate into effective tactical voting owing 
partly to confused proclamations by Church authorities. In the 2004 parliamentary Lok Sabha 
elections, there was reportedly a clear statement from Church authorities to favour ‘secular 
parties’ and consequently Christians voted for the Congress-JMM coalition which helped the 
combine to do well. In the 2005 Assembly, however, Church leaders apparently equivocated 
urging voters to vote with their conscience, thereby adding to the muddle of a severely 
differentiated tribal voting pattern caused by disastrous seat adjustments within the Congress-
JMM alliance. In fact, Jesuit social activists and village level Christian leaders discourage such 
coordination since electoral contests have divisive effects within communities that have a 
bearing on pervasive adivasi mobilisation.64 
 
Getting back to social movement activism, Christians are part of important groups like 
Jharkhand Organisation for Human Rights (JOHAR), which originated in Chaibasa as a loose 
grouping of activists dealing with advocacy, training and mobilising on land and displacement 
issues. It brings out a monthly newsletter called Johar Sakham (Johar Leaf) that documents 
human rights violations. It is popular among young activists. In the mid 1980s, the Delhi unit of 
Johar, composed of students from Delhi University, fought for the rights of adivasi women 
                                                 
61 There is no title of religious interest in the list of publications released by the Indian Social Institute at 
www.isidelhi.org.in/publication/books.htm . Worth noting that Fr. Pinto has co-authored a book (with Somen 
Chakraborty) titled Relevance of Communist Manifesto (New Delhi: ISI, 2000).  
62 Interviews with activists, Ranchi, April 2005.  
63 Culled from interviews with activists. 
64 Impressions of interviewed activists, New Delhi and Ranchi.  
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working as domestic helps in Delhi, who were prone to oppressive working conditions, sexual 
harassment and erratic salary payments. These students used to meet aggrieved groups of 
working women in public parks on Sunday mornings listening and taking action on grievances 
and imparting information on worker rights etc. This was a particularly successful endeavour as 
the Catholic Church soon took responsibility for this group, forming the Delhi Domestic 
Working Women’s Forum (DDWWF).65  
 
Groups like JOHAR or Akhra, that produces documentaries on people’s movements, bring 
together a variety of student and women leaders who were typically politicised when studying in 
colleges in Palamau, Hazaribagh and Ranchi during the early 1990s. The more experienced and 
educated activists come from middle class backgrounds that are able to forge links with 
established national level activist circuits in Delhi. But the core of activists in Jharkhand tend to 
be from lower middle class or poorer background with access to education that politicises them 
without endowing the necessary ‘social capital’ that middle class Christians have in order to 
procure jobs reserved for Scheduled Tribes. They also do not have the resources to start 
independent organisations in places like Ranchi and thus eke a living by multitasking marginal 
jobs in NGOs, running small businesses like shops, roadside restaurants or typing institutes. In 
Ranchi, for instance, there are at least 25-30 activists in the age group 23-40, most of whom are 
reportedly Christian, who make a living by filing daily stories to Hindi papers like Prabhat Khabar, 
Hindustan etc which accept their reportage but reportedly pay no more than Rs. 50 or Rs. 100 per 
story (as on September 2004). Their writing focuses on everyday stories of adivasi exploitation, 
instances of police brutality, reports of burgeoning struggles against development projects etc. 
But it is an uncertain existence, as they do not have the requisite protection that mainstream 
journalists have especially in confrontations with the police etc and as noted the remuneration is 
inadequate to make ends meet. This is the flip side of spontaneous, informal, unregistered 
associational life in Jharkhand; activists pay a severe price for refusing to be drawn into the state 
regulated civil society for either fear of losing their political flexibility or by their inability to 
establish formal NGOs owing to limited social capital or economic resource. 
 
Owing to their roots in villages66, their extensive contacts in the activist subculture built up over 
years of crisscrossing the region while lending their organisational skills to little known struggles, 
these activists have been able to sustain links with rural areas in a way that Christian politicians 
of the Jharkhand Party could not in the past, by consistently focusing on agrarian struggles.  
 
Reared in a discourse of oppression and subordination that point to inimical designs of the state 
and dikus on their land, the prevalence of adivasis being cheated in marketplaces while selling or 
buying products, their being subject to abject working conditions in mines and construction 
activity etc, the activists have a deep antipathy toward the state and commercial activities of the 
dikus. The experience of development projects that caused large-scale loss of land makes them 
perennially suspicious of state policy and actors. It is common for them to hear them say ‘sarkar 
tho chor hai’ or even ‘hum to sarkar shaitan maan the hain’ (‘The government is a thief’ or ‘we believe 
the government is the devil’). Activists are well aware that extending state activity in the region 
entails further loss of land in the region. There is a sharpened awareness of losing further land in 
                                                 
65 Indian Social Institute, The Tribal Domestic Worker at the Crossroads: A report on the Status of Tribal Delhi Domestic 
Working Women (Delhi: 1993).  
66 In Ranchi district, 92.49 percent of Mundari speakers lived in rural areas as compared to 74.69 percent of 
Kurukh/Oraon speakers and 95.10 percent of Santals.  In Gumla district, 98.60 of kurukhs reside in rural areas. 
(Census of India 1991: Bihar State District Profile 1991, p. 185.) 
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the Mundari Khuntkatti areas of Khunti, which has been provoked partly by the adverse effects 
in neighbouring areas like Hatia and the Koel Karo project to the east towards Torpa. This is an 
area of Christian concentration and activists are opposed to suggestions that Khunti subdivision 
be upgraded into a separate district. As Kalyan Munda of the Munda Development Action 
Committee says: ‘A new district will give the government an excuse to build a new subdivisional 
and block offices, courts and community halls. There will be village schools, health centres; 
plans for angan wadi schools are already in place. These are all pretexts for taking over land. Many 
more dikus will come into the district as a result. Land will be taken over for these facilities but 
the adivasis themselves will have no access to them. We have also seen the kind of displacement 
that happened because of the Heavy Engineering Corporation in Hatia. Roads will be 
constructed against our will and then they introduce a road tax!’67  
 
Along with some sarna activists, these Christian activists also share a disdain for establishment 
Christianity for having failed to support the agitations openly, for preaching an individualist 
prosperity gospel that creates a self-absorbed middle class and for the Church’s cultural stances 
that alienates Christians from sarna adivasis. While maintaining contact with Church 
congregants, their activism is borne out of a functional relativism that sustains meaningful links 
with sarnas and privileges adivasi elements in the construction of self-identity to foster 
communal harmony. For instance, in the annual event to mark UN Indigenous Peoples Day on 
9th August, activists have consciously chosen to keep religious elements out of ceremonies. To 
be sure, power dynamics, petty jealousies expressed as rumours of profiteering by those heading 
NGOs exist but that has not led to the kind of intense divisions that can jeopardise their ability 
to coordinate mass action. There is a notional shorthand as to who the reliable activists are – 
regardless of organisational fealty – which helps in supporting each other’s activities, attending 
each other’s programmes and the like. 
 
Impact of Christian social activism 
 
An important area of collaboration between sarnas, independent Christian activists and Jesuits is 
the drive towards securing tribal self-rule. This is done principally by raising awareness about the 
powers of the Gram Sabha (village assembly) as instituted through the Provisions of the 
Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 1996. This Act is intended to devolve financial 
and administrative powers to the village level as per customary law and practices. Importantly, 
the PESA Act says the Gram Sabhas shall be consulted before the acquisition of land for 
development projects that include mining leases. Through printed literature in the vernacular 
and village level consultations, these activists also disseminate the implications of the 1997 
Samata judgment of the Supreme Court which ruled that the state had no right to grant leases – 
even on government owned forest land – to private companies on areas governed by the Fifth 
Schedule and that only cooperative societies solely run by Scheduled Tribes could mine in such 
areas.68 I came across one NGO in the Khunti subdivision which has been organizing meetings 
of clan leaders in particular areas with plans to extend to regional conclaves to take advantage of 
Gram Sabha provisions and revive the Munda manki system of governance.  
 
One effect of this grassroot momentum has been that the Jharkhand government has not able to 
conduct panchayat elections even though it passed the state panchayati raj act in 2001. Civil 
                                                 
67 Interview with Kalyan Munda, Ranchi, March 2005.  
68 See Asha Krishnakumar, ‘The ‘Samata’ Judgment,’ Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue 19, 11-24 September 2004.  
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society actors are opposed to conducting panchayat elections, preferring to confer legal 
recognition to existing customary village sabhas that reputedly have a more consultative 
decision-making process than voting procedures. Elected panchayats, they reckon, create a rival 
power structure in villages which state level politicians could manipulate to coopt or rupture the 
existing consensus (although some would see this as a ruse by existing adivasi elites to retain 
control). The state government continues its efforts to counter this grassroot coalition. In 
November 2005, the Arjun Munda Government passed a Cabinet resolution which de-reserved 
the post of Mukhiya (headmen) in panchayat segments that have less than 40 per cent of 
Scheduled Tribes.69 This is arguably in violation of the Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas 
Act 1996 which decreed that all post of gram panchayat mukhias in Scheduled Areas will be 
reserved for the Scheduled Tribes.70 The state government is simply attempting to create an 
alternative demand for quotas from non-adivasi sections. The government estimably hopes to 
create a local demand for panchayat elections in scheduled areas by disbursing money to 
neighbouring panchayats. 
 
The activists are also geared to resist the state government in the field of tourism. In response to 
the 2002 State Industrial Policy which said ‘Priority shall be accorded to develop eco-tourism, 
religious tourism, heritage- tourism, adventure tourism, amusement parks, resorts and way side 
amenities,’ a group of 14 organisations came together to form the Jharkhand Tourism 
Coordination Committee and frame an alternative tourist policy which demands adivasi control 
and ownership over such projects should be they implemented.71 A document titled ‘Jharkhand 
Peoples Tourism Policy’ assails proposed plans for elitist bias attempting only to cater to tourist 
industry and the visitor while leaving out adivasis and dalits who happen to be owners of the 
lands under consideration for the expansion of tourist infrastructure. The state government 
should thus undertake to ‘protect the ownership, control and profit rights of these Scheduled 
communities’.72  
 
The collaboration of sarna and Christian activists is evident, for instance, in the legal practice of 
Ratnaker Bhengra, a young Munda Christian lawyer, who is said to be the first adivasi with his 
own chamber at the Ranchi High Court (which he is now sharing with a Jesuit Oraon lawyer). 
An observant Anglican, Bhengra pursued a Law degree in Delhi University, going on to an 
M.Phil in international law from Jawaharlal Nehru University and returned to Jharkhand to work 
for adivasi rights, eschewing the expected route of seeking a job in the administrative services 
that fellow middle class Christians tend to do. He was associated with JOHAR in Delhi and 
makes a living as a lawyer while devoting time for public interest litigations addressing adivasi 
interests. His background in international law has come in handy, enabling him to be part of the 
UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples that came out with a draft declaration in 1993. He is 
also a member of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous People, a body with ECOSOC status 
under the UN Commission on Human Rights. Owing to the types of cases that he has fought 
                                                 
69 ‘Govt. to amend Panchayati Raj Act, The Hindu, 4 November 2004.  
70 Stan Swamy, ‘Tussle for reservation quota: Adivasi identity is based not on numbers but on ethnicity’, The 
Telegraph, 27 July 2005.  
71In its 2004 memorandum to the 12th Finance Commission, the government sought Rs. 185 crore from the Centre 
to develop tourist spots across the state. Tourist areas envisaged for development include Maithon Dam area, 
Netarhat, Chandil lake and Udhwa bird sanctuary. Government of Jharkhand, Memorandum to the Twelfth 
Finance Commission, July 2004.  
72  ‘Jharkhand Peoples Tourism Policy’ (undated: Ranchi), published by Jharkhand Tourism Coordination 
Committee. The booklet features details of the ‘tourism network’ of activist leaders who are assigned to coordinate 
protests for 21 separate tourist destinations.  
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along with non-Christian activists and his international involvement, Bhengra is regarded highly 
among non-Christian adivasis in both rural and urban settings. 
 
The public interest litigation, delineated below, that he has been involved in league with other 
adivasi lawyers has not met with much success, as the courts have rejected their pleas, but they 
can be understood as important elements in the struggle to secure adivasi rights and autonomy 
in the relatively new state.  
 
The Shanti Khalkho v. the State of Bihar case73 dealt with a petition seeking a directive from the 
High Court that the recruitment guidelines for primary school teachers laid down by the 
Education Department of the Government of Bihar concerning the use of mother tongue are 
strictly adhered to, particularly in Scheduled Areas. The Education Department ruled in 1953 
that ‘throughout the primary and middle school stages, that is the first eight years, the medium 
of instruction shall be the mother tongue.74 In Bihar it also recognised the adivasi languages of 
Santhali, Oraon, Ho, Mundari in addition to Hindi, Bengali, Oriya, Urdu, Maithili & English. 
The petition, evidently operating on the assumption that non-adivasis were getting recruited 
over the decades as qualified teachers to teach in adivasi languages, asked the court that adequate 
testing of bilingual ability be mandatory for applicants for primary school teachers. The Court 
took notice of the State of Bihar’s counter-affidavit which claimed the guidelines were being 
followed and ruled that ‘no further directions were warranted’ with the anodyne remark that ‘the 
Jharkhand Public Service Commission is expected to perform its duties properly, being a 
constitutional body.’75 
 
The Paklu Pahan v. the State of Bihar was another public interest case filed in the High Court by 
a Mundari priest asking the Court to issue a restraining order on the construction of a medium-
irrigation project called the Surangai Reservoir Scheme. At the time of the petition, the 
government had already acquired the land under the Land Acquisition Act, as it was to submerge 
24 Mundari Khuntkatti villages in the Tamar circle of Ranchi district. It had issued the 
notification, paid compensation, assigned plots of land to rehabilitate the displaced families and, 
in the words, provided ‘every fundamental facilities like road, temple, tube-well, well, tank, 
community centre, community lavatory, children’s park, electrification, drainage, construction of 
culverts etc.’76 The petition argued that the Land Acquisition Act used to procure land for the 
reservoir scheme infringed the fundamental right to belief as enshrined in Article 25 of the 
Constitution and Sections 50 (7), 240 and 241 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 198877 by 
submerging ‘hadgiris’, where the bones of Mundari Khuntkatti ancestors were buried; sarnas, the 
sacred groves, where Munda deities are ‘permanently seated’ and other sites ‘inseparably woven 
with Mundari religious beliefs. The High Court dismissed the application cited two previous 
cases where Land Acquisition Act was in conflict with religious beliefs.  
                                                 
73 CWJC No. 1490 (98R) in the High Court of Judicature at Patna Ranchi Bench, Ranchi. For the Petitioner: M/s. 
R. Bhengra and H.K. Mahato 
74 As recorded in page 35 of Government of Bihar Education Dept., Res. No. 645 ER of Ranchi dated 13 August 
1953. 
75 Ruling by Justice Tapan Sen in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1490 of 1998 [R].  
76 Ruling by Justices A. Alams and N. N. Singh, CWJC No. 2349 of 1996 [R].  
77 Section 50 (7) of the CNT Act reads: Nothing herein contained shall enable the Deputy Commissioner to 
authorise the acquisition of any part of a holding whereon a temple, mosque or other place of worship, sacred 
grove, burial or burning ground exists. Section 240-242 deal with ‘restriction on transfer of Mundari Khunt-
Kattidari tenancies. Handbook of Chotanagpur Tenancy Laws (Allahabad: Rajpal and Company, 2002), p. 47 & pp. 135-
137.  
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Bhengra is also involved in attempts to secure a separate identity for sarna religion even if many 
adivasis incorporate elements of Hindu Vaishnavaite religion into their religious practice. This is 
to prevent the dissolution of sarna adivasi identity in the face of active Hinduising efforts by 
groups such as the RSS and the BJP.  
 
For instance, there is an ongoing public interest case concerning the construction of an electric 
crematorium for Hindus authorised to be built by the district administration at Aanchal in 
Ranchi district. The proposed crematorium will be on a plot that has been used as a burial 
ground called masna or hargari, by Oraons for over 100 years. The petitioners argued that tribal 
belief warrants that ‘their respectable dead are buried only at their burial places, and if someone 
dies at a far away place then at least a piece of his bone is to be buried in that graveyard’ and that 
the proposed crematorium would deprive those professing the sarna faith of their masna ‘for all 
times to come.’78 The petition also points to the alleged insensitive and impractical handling of 
the situation by the district administration has created bad blood between the people following 
the Sarna faith and the Hindus. It is backed by supplementary affidavits from priests of the local 
sarna samiti (informal groups of sarna activists) attesting that the ground was used as a masna. 
The court is currently considering this public interest case.  
 
Activists have also sought to secure a minority religion status for the sarna religion as the 2001 
Census operations were underway. An interesting petition on behalf of Rejan Guria in 2001 
made two pertinent pleas. One that Census operations that were conducted in February be re-
done in July-August and that ‘Sarna’ column be included as a religion as it deprives them of 
minority status that would help access development schemes and benefits.79 It questions the 
decision of the Registrar General (Census) to conduct the census operations in February when a 
significant portion of Scheduled Tribes ‘are compelled to seasonally migrate’ in ‘exercise of their 
right to life and livelihood.’ Since the times and locations to which the Scheduled Tribes has 
varied in the intervening ten years since the previous census, the petition reckons that the 
adivasis should be enumerated in their permanent domicile / ancestral homes as that is the only 
lasting connection they have while pursuing a partly itinerant mode of work. To that end, the 
petition prefers the July-August period as a preferable time for conducting census operations, as 
most Scheduled Tribes will have returned to their homes.  
 
In the course of claiming a separate column for the ‘sarna’ religion that could be called ‘Adi 
Dharm’, the petition points to the absence of the same even though the majority of adivasis are 
known to practice the sarna faith. The petition appends reports of opposition to the census 
operation as a result of the absence of the ‘sarna’ column in East and West Singhbhum. It 
highlights certain gaffes in the 1991 Census that shed light on the authenticity of its findings 
relating to Scheduled Tribes. For instance, it account for 163 individuals as belonging to the 
Johar faith. Johar happens to be a mode of adivasi greeting and cannot be reckoned as a belief 
system. The 1991 Census also delineates 18 religions under the category of ‘Other religions and 
persuasions’ that together have 1,442,766 adherents out of a total of 6,616,914 Scheduled Tribes 
in Bihar.80 Deducting 1.4 million tribals of ‘other religions’ from a total 6.6 million Scheduled 
                                                 
78 Dhananjay Kumar Dubey v. State of Jharkhand, In the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, Civil Writ Jurisdiction 
WP (PIL) No. 6348 of 2003.  
79 Rejan Guria v. Union of India & others, W.P. (PIL) No. 3204 of 2001, in the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi.  
80 The petition appears to have some factual errors. The figure for ‘other religions and persuasions’ is 1,443,258, 
Census of India 1991, Series 1, Paper 1 of 1995, Religion, p. 18. The tribal religions mentioned are Bhumij, Gond, 
Ho, Johar, Kharwar, Manab Dharma, Mikir, Munda, Oraon, Paharia, Sadri, Santal, Sari Dharma, Sauriya, Sing 
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Tribes, the petition questions why 21 percent of adivasis have been unaccounted for in terms of 
religion. Further it asks the court to clarify if the religion called ‘Swarna’ in the 1991 Census that 
has 1,417,427 adherents is in fact a spelling mistake for ‘Sarna’ religion. This is important as 
‘Swarna’ might be confused colloquially with ‘swarna log’ that refers to caste Hindus. 
 
The court is urged to include a column and a code for ‘sarna’ religion to be called ‘Adi Dharm’ 
on the assumption that a majority of adivasis practice that faith. A book by Prof. Ram Dayal 
Munda called Adi Dharm outlining the key belief and rituals of the faith is appended as proof of 
the popular appeal of the religion. The petition argues that the absence of an assigned Sarna 
code and column ensures that followers of ‘regional, local and other religions’, which in 
Jharkhand number more than Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains, are deprived of their minority rights.81 
The High Court dismissed the petition saying it had ‘no merit.’82 It is interesting to note that the 
Catholic Church too is taking the issue of adivasi identity seriously. The website of Ranchi 
Archdiocese refers says the Christian population of Jharkhand is around 17 percent, much 
higher than the 4.05 percent figure of the 2001 Census. It also pointedly disavows attempts to 
alienate the sarna element in Jharkhand’s Christian identity. A biographic sketch of Cardinal 
Telesphore Toppo in fact describes his religion as ‘Catholic Christian sarna.’83  
 
The Koel Karo Movement 
 
One popular movement against state development projects that is indicative of the struggles in 
areas of (relative) Christian tribal concentration in Jharkhand and the concert of political 
activism that has been brought to bear to hold off such encroachments has been the Koel Karo 
movement. The movement against Koel Karo Hydel Power Project (hereafter KKP) since 1977 
serves as a model for pan tribal, inter-religious cooperation, particularly at the grassroot level, to 
successfully resist state attempts to takeover land for development purposes. It is now 
recognised in some activist circles as the most successful anti-dam movement in India by its 
ability to keep the coercive capacity of the state at bay just by the sheer novelty of tactics and 
unflinching tribal solidarity on this issue over the last 30 years. The project was supposed to have 
been completed by 1981 but it virtually made no progress despite various attempts to revive it. It 
came into prominence in February 2001, a tellingly ironical time i.e. three months after the 
formation of the Jharkhand state which the adivasis fought for, when eight people were killed 
and 27 wounded, all adivasis, after police fired on people gathered at Tapkara, near Torpa, to 
protest police brutality on a few tribals a day earlier.  
 
The project was planned by the Bihar State Electricity Board (BSEB) in 1973 in the Koel Karo 
area, that lies 80 kilometres southwest of Ranchi, for the purpose of generating 710 megawatt of 
power for the benefit of Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal and Sikkim. The Koel River was to dammed 
at Basia, near Majikhera and Tetra villages in Gumla district, and the north Karo River near 
Loajimi village in the Torpa block of Ranchi district. The two water reservoirs were to be linked 
                                                                                                                                                       
Bonga, Swarna, Tana Bhagat and Tribal religion. In the 2001 census, those practising ‘other religions’ had gone up 
to 3,514,472, amounting to 13 percent of the total population. See http://www.censusindia.net/religiondata/ 
accessed 9 September 2006.  
81 The petition pleads: ‘That regional, local or other religions should not loose out in benefits or represent-ability as 
compared to even those religions that are normally enumerated as national religious minorities, particularly at the 
state level or Jharkhand level’. In the 1991 Census, there 78212 Sikhs, 23049 Jains and 3518 Buddhists in Bihar as 
compared to ‘1417427’ classified as ‘Swarna’ followers.  
82 High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi Order Sheet, Ruling by Chief Justice V. K. Gupta, Justice D.N. Prasad, WP 
(PIL) No. 3204 of 2001, dated 23 July 2001. 
83 http://www.ranchiarchdiocese.org/prelate.htm , accessed 10 September 2006.  
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by a 34.7-kilometer long canal.84 There has been no unanimity about the number of villages to be 
submerged. The detailed project report claimed that only 42 villages would be affected while a 
Collector of Ranchi, B. K. Sinha, estimated in 1986 that 7,063 households in 112 villages would 
be affected.85 The people’s organization, Koel Karo Jan Sanghatan (KKJS), estimates that 256 
villages would be submerged with a total population of 150,000, 90 percent of whom are 
adivasis.  
 
The project area has a sizeable Christian population. Soma Munda, a sarna, who has been the 
president of KKJS for over a decade, put the figure roughly at 50 percent (‘there are 
Christians in every village’; he also says that government officials blame Christians for the 
movement), while Jesuits reckon it to be close to 40 percent. Significantly, till the early 1990s, 
the KKJS did not seek or get help from organized civil society groups, including the Jesuits. The 
activists sought legal advice from lawyers and received technical advice on survey operations 
from Delhi-based academics, but the movement was wholly sustained by village level leadership, 
composed of khuntkattidars and educated adivasis with some organizing experience. Thus Koel 
Karo stands as a monument to inter-religious tribal collaboration at the grassroots.  
 
Moses Guria, a resident of Loajimi and a schoolteacher who worked for worker’s rights 
while working in Jamshedpur started the movement in 1975-76.86 Moses grew up outside 
Jharkhand as his father worked in the Army as a chaplain during World War II. He too was a 
figure of some local renown; when he retired and bought a house near Tapkara, the village was 
renamed as Anandpur in his honour. Moses Guria, on learning that the BSEB was acquiring 
land and disbursing compensation, mobilized village leaders and urged them to merge existing 
interest groups called Jan Kalyan Samitis in the Koel and Karo regions to form the KKJS, of 
which he became the first president. They first launched a kam roko (stop work) campaign in 
December 1978, preventing the unloading of cement and steel from railway bogies at Pakra 
station for several days. (Mass mobilization is perceived to be easy once consensus over the 
struggle’s worth is achieved; regular night meetings and impromptu rallies can be summoned in a 
matter of hours even in isolated areas through the traditional mode of relaying messages over 
drums.)  
 
Negotiating strategy moved from maximalist positions that sacred groves (sarnas) and burial 
grounds of ancestors (sasandiris) cannot be submerged or removed to wrangling over the 
particulars of the resettlement package. These negotiations were punctuated by long stalemates. 
Following the kam roko (‘stop work’) agitation, the work was stalled but the movement agreed to 
a fresh survey to ascertain the extent of affected area. The survey was conducted but the results 
were withheld from KKJS. Soma Munda says ‘the government was bent on deceiving us.’ The 
BSEB exhausted by the agitation and spiralling project costs handed over the project in April 
1980 to the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC). By 1983, the KKJS prepared a 
complete rehabilitation package that included demands to relocate 256 villages, 152 sacred 
groves and nearly 300 burial grounds. 
 
                                                 
84 For a detailed survey of the project see An Independent Enquiry into the Police Firing at Tapkara: Resistance to the Koel-
Karo Project, Jharkhand by The Indian People’s Tribunal of Environment and Human Rights, headed by Justice 
Rajinder Sachar, January 2002.  
85 Ibid. pdf document,  p. 14.  
86  This account of the Koel Karo movement has been reconstructed from interviews in the Koel Karo area 
principally with Soma Munda, president, KKJS, Marcus Guria, vice-president, Rejan Guria, Secretary, KKJS and 
other activists in the area in addition to the Indian People’s Tribunal report.  
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In 1985, around 300 CRPF and Home Guard personnel were introduced in the forested area 
near Loajimi even as negotiations were on in Ranchi with the KKJS leadership. These are 
narrated with some hilarity by Soma Munda who recalls the days when the paramilitary force 
moved in:  
 
The District Collector and SDO were, in the course of talks, entertaining us; urging us to eat 
more and more of the good south Indian food that was laid out for us. They thought we are 
fools! They were trying to convince us about the usefulness of the project. We were telling him 
that khuntkatti lands are not transferable; that sacred groves cannot be violated. And then the 
Deputy Commissioner tells us that the CRPF is being stationed there to ‘keep the peace.’ I said, 
peace was always there beforehand; you were the one who brought ashanti (conflict) in our 
midst.87  
 
The people immediately adopted non-cooperation tactics, which were effective as the camp was 
in the inaccessible forested area adjacent to the Koel River amidst an unpaved landscape, and at 
least eight kilometres off the Torpa main road. Women adivasis prevented the CRPF men from 
cutting wood, and the latter were threatened by the villagers that the bathing and drinking water 
would be poisoned. Also no adivasi volunteered to work for them and there was a liquor boycott 
in place as well. The Torpa Block Development Officer (BDO) was prevented from visiting the 
area also by women. A round the clock monitoring of the camp also created everyday sanitation 
issues for the troops. The Committee ordered sowing plants and shrubs on the kuccha road 
made by the troops to the area. When the plants blossomed, the troops were instantly accused of 
driving over their lands and threatened litigation to that effect. After 15 days, in July 1985, the 
CRPF left the area quietly by night.  
 
Later that year the KKJS offered the NHPC two villages – Bhagidera, near Tetra in the Koel 
region and Kamda near Koccha in the Karo region – to build the model resettlement villages on 
traditional lines featuring spaces for a sacred grove and a burial ground. But the NHPC did not 
bother to explore this option. There was a lull for a decade till Laloo Prasad Yadav, chief 
minister of Bihar, announced in June 1995 that Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao would lay the 
foundation stone of the Koel Karo project. By this time the KKJS had decided to totally reject 
the project. Munda felt: We had no faith in GOI. We decided that it was futile to hold talks with 
the government and then we finally rejected the project, demanding its end for all time. Guria 
adds: We realized that we could not fight the sarkar, but we also knew that the sarkar was shaitan 
(the devil). We have seen the effects of HEC, steel plants at Rourkela and Durgapur where 
rehabilitation never happened. So we decided never to accept the project in principle. We will 
just fight non-violently through jan shakti (people power). 
 
Accordingly, nearly 16000 adivasis gathered at Torpa for a week prior to inauguration day on 5 
July 1995 to occupy the field where the Prime Minister and Chief Minister’s helicopter was 
supposed to land. ‘It was peaceful and exhilarating; we did not carry our bow and arrows. There 
were massive meetings. Eventually the PM did not come and the inauguration was postponed 
indefinitely,’ says an activist. By this time the movement attracted the support of mainstream 
adivasi politicians like N.E. Horo, Stephen Marandi, Ram Dayal Munda and activists across 
Jharkhand who openly supported the agitation.  
 
                                                 
87 Interview with Soma Munda, April 2005.  
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After Jharkhand was formed, the BJP Chief Minister Arjun Munda reportedly went on record 
saying that Koel Karo will be decided by the will of the people.88 In August 2003, the Chief 
Minister announced that the Koel Karo project would be scrapped. He merely stated that 
escalating project costs of Rs 7.92 per unit of electricity and the cost of rehabilitation made the 
project unviable.89 There is a view that the project was scrapped because of competing interests 
lobbying for thermal power, and newspaper reports barely give credence to the role of the KKJS 
in ‘scrapping’ the project.  
 
However, the KKJS is not impressed. By April 2005, nearly two years later, the Government of 
Jharkhand had not issued a gazette notification to back the Chief Minister’s statement. If the 
notification is not forthcoming in the near future, this could be a case of deferring state 
gratification, as it were, to dissipate adivasi anger and wait for bonds of aboriginal fury to loosen. 
This is a periodical strategy deployed to ‘normalize’ the activists whose levels of education and 
exposure draw them toward urban modes of living or simply lead them to ‘settle down’ 
following which plans to revive projects like the Koel Karo can be re-announced. This was 
evident in interviews with student activists involved in both Koel Karo and Netarhat 
movements who felt they had personally lost out because of selfless involvement in the 
movement for years. One young Catholic Netarhat activist, in his late twenties and previously an 
office-bearer of the Palamau Student Union, who is currently struggling to make a living in 
Ranchi as a stringer for Hindi newspapers, says that he has stopped urging younger people to 
join popular agitations as it harms their long-term individual prospects.  
 
Christianity and Culture: Obstacles to inter-religious cooperation 
 
What have been the challenges to such inter-religious mobilization? Informants point to the 
Christian clergy’s disdain for adivasi belief which is transmitted particularly to both the average 
congregant and upwardly mobile Christians that create wedges among communities. In villages 
observant Christians are not known to participate in the sarhul puja. Not only that, the Sal flower 
is sacred for sarnas as it is used in the Sarhul puja. Christians have a tendency to trivialise by 
using Sal flower as a decorative piece. There is also a convention that the Sal flower should not 
be brought into the village before the Sarhul puja. In times when Easter falls prior to Sarhul, 
Christians violate this Sarna custom by bringing the flower into the villages to decorate their 
churches and houses thus alienating fellow sarnas. ‘Why cannot they get any other flower,’ fumes 
Kalyan Munda.  
 
There is an offering solicited among villagers for a sarna puja which is traditionally held before 
threshing grain. Christians are known not to contribute to the offering, sometimes provocatively 
countering: ‘why should I give donation here when I give my offering to the church. Do you 
help me with my offering to the church?’ This kind of cultural inflexibility is existent in villages 
even when Munda Christians in the region are not known to be fervent revivalist believers. The 
Christian clergy is blamed for these strictures whereby participation in traditional sarna rituals are 
considered sinful.  
 
                                                 
88 KKJS activists wonder which people he might refer to: people in Ranchi or people in Delhi? 
89 Munda said “This was a very good project provided it was completed 20 years ago as initially proposed. But the 
successive governments of unified Bihar were not serious about the project because of which the cost went up from 
Rs. 350 crore to Rs 2,500 crore.” ‘Curtains come down on project,’ The Telegraph, 30 August 2003.  
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A couple of sarna activists also objected to the Christian habit of burying the dead with the head 
pointing west in contrast to the sarnas facing south. This is thought to be the idea of 
missionaries. However the Khunti diocese Archbishop denied that Christians had any such 
burial customs.  
 
Also in the villages, the norm is to greet one another with a slight bow of the head and a folding 
of the hands (about chest high) and saying ‘Johar’! Sarna activists take umbrage to Christians 
refraining from saying ‘Johar’; a word that roughly means ‘may the fruits of this land satisfy you.’ 
Educated non-Christian tribals frequently greet each other with Johar but educated or observant 
Christians reportedly prefer the urban habit of the handshake. Another thing which incenses 
activists like Kalyan Munda is that observant Christians prefer to say ‘Jai Masihi ki!’ (Victory to 
Christ) to each other. He says ‘imagine a scenario when ten people have gathered for idle talk 
and then a Christian comes along and greets most of them with ‘Johar’ and then says ‘Jai Masihi 
ki’ to a couple of Christians – think of the effect it has on the rest. They will think that he is 
thicker with them than us.’ Some sarnas resent that Christian schools were getting increasingly 
profited oriented; that they favour Christian students and that sarna students are subject to 
Christian instruction that leads to conversion.  
 
 Nirmal Minz, a former Bishop of the Gossner Evangelical Lutheran Church, faults the Church’s 
cultural policy for alienating adivasi Christians from sarna brethren.  
 
The theology, liturgy, canon law, church discipline, practice and life style of the community 
continue to be as in the days of the missionaries… The attitude that regards primal religion as 
superstitious and devil worship, and the tribal people as heathens still continues to remain the 
same… The lay members of the congregations and churches are more fundamentalist and less 
evangelical in their outlook. Poor Hindi or Santali translations of German, English, Danish, 
Norwegian and American hymns and songs introduced by the missionaries are still used and 
actually preferred to the indigenous songs and hymns in the worship services. The use of 
traditional tribal drums and music and instruments are still taboo for the churches in 
Chotanagpur. The city congregations would prefer to use English songs rather than the hymns 
and songs in the vernacular language. Preaching in the mother tongue has not taken the pains to 
go to the original biblical languages to translate and interpret scriptures. Second and third hand 
resources have been accepted as adequate in congregations. The tribal languages are used, but 
worldviews of the indigenous peoples are not acknowledged. In fact, they are rejected as being 
heathen. The cognitive approach is preferred to intuitive/mystical and visionary ways of knowing 
and understanding.90 
 
Such inter-religious schisms have led some sarna activists to demand that tribal Christians should 
no longer get quotas in jobs and education.91 Hindu nationalists are reportedly patronising the 
pahans (adivasi priests) in the villages in an attempt to exploit anti-Christian sentiment and also 
                                                 
90 Nirmal Minz, Rise Up, My People, and Claim the Promise: The Gospel among the Tribes of India, Delhi: ISPCK, 1997, p. 
53. 
91 ‘Strip converts of quota benefits, demand tribals’,  
http://www.newkerala.com/news4.php?action=fullnews&id=11538, posted 25 August 2006. This is a demand that 
has cropped up periodically over the years. In October 1968, Karthik Oroan, a leading adivasi politician, deposed 
before a joint committee of parliament demanding that Christians be descheduled, ostensibly in response to 
Christians garnering greater share of jobs due to higher educational levels. Adivasi Ekta Parishad petitioned that 
Christians should be descheduled on the grounds that they never called themselves Adivasis, refused to associate 
with adivasis in social and religious ceremonies and that the Christians started claiming to be adivasis only after 
reservations were introduced. Vidyarthi and Sahay op. cit, 116 and 123. 
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posit the priests as a counter to traditional Munda headmen who either lead popular agitations 
or are in a position to control panchayats should elections be held in the future.92 Such divisions 
explain BJP’s electoral successes to an extent but do not significantly undermine scope for 
organising popular agitations.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper indicates that the sizeable institutional presence of Christianity and its rhetorical 
empathy for adivasi concerns creates the context for politicising youth and sustaining the 
discourse of subordination that undergirds tribal politics in Jharkhand today. (It is also worth 
clarifying that Christian activism in the state is not discernibly backed by foreign missionary 
groups.) Christian activists are deploying their educational advantage and links with national and 
transnational civil society groups by active involvement in popular agitations through informal 
protest formations and networks. As seen in the case of Ratnaker Bhengra, they are also 
involved in attempts to clarify adivasi identity with a view to clinch state patronage in the newly-
formed province. Of particular interest are the informal networks of Jesuit, Protestant and non-
Christian sarna activists who are able to forge protest clusters quickly and coordinate advocacy 
and mobilisation strategies against the state or industrial projects. The study notes that for 
Christian activists reviewed here, adivasi identity is privileged over religious belonging in so far 
as it is expressed in favour of political objectives and this is linked to distinctive legacies of 
conversion. Religious differentiation thus has not significantly undermined collaborative 
partnerships with non-Christian adivasis against common adversaries, although conservative 
cultural stances of the clergy are a constraining factor. And uneven links between grassroots 
associations and Christian clergy hamper electoral coordination although anecdotal evidence 
exists for certain areas.  
 
These dynamics are significant for the way both Christians social movements are likely to be 
perceived and represented particularly at a time when the latter are able to contain the 
momentum of liberalisation-led industrialising agenda. The interplay of economic potential and 
socio-political vulnerability in Jharkhand has already seen dramatic developments, beyond the 
phenomena of popular agitations considered above. In July 2006, the head of the steel giant 
Arcelor-Mittal, Lakshmi Mittal, decided to move his investments in Jharkhand worth $9 billion 
to neighbouring Orissa, partly due to problems linked to land acquisition – doubtlessly a result 
of the activist momentum built up networks of social movements.93  
As the exigencies of political order and investor confidence take centre-stage, it is likely that 
social movement activism will be viewed with deep suspicion by both state and non-state actors 
with interests in accelerated industrialisation. Already the airtime recently granted to purported 
Maoist threats appears proportionate to the stalled pace of industrialisation owing to popular 
agitations in Jharkhand and elsewhere. News organisations frequently report purported Maoist 
plans to wage war against ‘special economic zones’, following a meeting of 100 ‘naxal’ leaders 
                                                 
92 This is conceivably a historic correction since the Pahan enjoyed equal status with the Munda till the latter’s civil 
duties conferred greater authority from the onset of colonialism by virtue of being in the forefront of advocacy 
campaigns to recover land.  
93 See Surojit Chatterjee, ‘Mittal may junk Jharkhand if progress not satisfactory,’ International Business Times, at 
http://in.ibtimes.com/articles/20060715/mittal-jharkhand-munda-patnaik-steel-posco-greenfield-investment-ore-
mines-iron-naveen.htm , posted 15 July 2006 and ‘'Thank you’ Mittal shifts deal to Orissa’, The Indian Express, 8 July 
2006, at http://www.indianexpress.com/story/8038.html  
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from 16 states. 94  In view of these polarising agendas, it is not inconceivable that social 
movement activism will be viewed through securitised perspectives – more so when it comes to 
the practices of Christian institutions and activists given that the latter are projected as merely 
conversionary agents by opposing Hindu nationalist groups. To that end, the implications of 
Christian activism may well have significance for other politically volatile states like Chhattisgarh, 
Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh that are fraught with the competing demands of marginalized 
adivasis, Hindu nationalist cadres, the extractive drives of foreign and national capital, and the 
ambitions of Maoist revolutionaries.  
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